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Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful. Yet there will stretch out before you 
an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending, ever-improving path. You know you will never get to the end 
of the journey. But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to the joy and glory of the climb. 
-- Winston Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures 
 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
Human cognition is influenced by “energetic” factors like effort or fatigue. 
Interestingly, seemingly easy or well-practiced tasks that still require a continuous attentional 
engagement, have been found especially susceptible to the effects of such energetic variables. 
Particularly in monotonous and cognitively little challenging tasks, impaired performance, 
from reduced efficiency to catastrophic errors, often results from temporary deficits in 
sustaining attention. 
A classic paradigm with minimal cognitive demands that is used for examining the most 
basic form of sustained attention is simple reaction-time tasks. These tasks require a rapid 
motor response to predefined stimuli. The reaction upon stimulus detection is always the 
same, and the only unknown variable is the exact moment of stimulus occurrence. Attaining 
and maintaining a state of readiness to respond in such tasks has been termed “alertness.” 
This thesis investigates cognitive-energetic mechanisms that contribute to alertness and its 
decrease over time as well as the neurobiological basis of alertness regulation. 
The first investigation (Study 1) examined in three 25-min simple reaction-time tasks, 
which posed different demands on attention via manipulations of stimulus salience, whether 
performance decrements with time on task can be better explained with increasing drifts of 
the attentional focus away from the task (distraction hypothesis) or with a depletion of 
attentional resources (mental-fatigue hypothesis). The performance and questionnaire data 
largely corroborated the latter explanation, since decrements and subjective fatigue increased 
more with higher attentional demands. The increase of self-reported task-unrelated thoughts 
over time, however, provided some evidence for the distraction hypothesis as well. Based on 
these findings, an approach is developed that incorporates both explanations in a hierarchical 
model of self-regulation. 
Study 2 examined the question as to what extent the mechanisms of temporal 
preparation under time uncertainty, which contribute to optimal performance in simple 
reaction-time tasks, suffer from exhaustion after prolonged continuous demands. In a 50-min 
simple reaction-time task, we found the typical reaction-time slowing with time on task but 
no change in parameters of temporal preparation (i.e. the so-called variable and sequential 
foreperiod effects, respectively). This suggests (a) that cognitive processes of temporal 
preparation do not significantly contribute to alertness decrements with time on task and (b) 
 that the mechanisms underlying temporal preparation are processes that are hardly 
susceptible to mental fatigue, such as nonintentional associative learning. 
The third experiment (Study 3) investigated the brain network subserving alertness 
regulation — independent of the sensory modality of the response signals. We used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure brain activity during simple reaction-time 
performance in tasks with auditory, tactile or visual stimuli. The results revealed a 
supramodal (i.e. modality-independent) brain network consisting of predominantly right-
lateralized cortical areas as well as brainstem and cerebellar structures. This corroborates the 
modality independence of previous findings from single-modality studies that used positron 
emission tomography and demonstrates that the notion of a right-lateralized network for 
alertness regulation can be generalized to tactile stimuli.  
Taken together, the results of the thesis show that a variety of – fatigable as well as non-
fatigable – processes contribute to maintaining response readiness in simple reaction-time 
tasks, which appear to be subserved by a widespread supramodal brain network. These 
findings raise the question for future research and application to what extent the construct 
“alertness” may be segregated into useful subcomponents to achieve a refined differentiation 
in diagnostic contexts. 
 
 
 KURZFASSUNG DER DISSERTATION 
 
Die menschliche Kognition wird von „energetischen“ Faktoren wie Anstrengung oder 
Müdigkeit beeinflusst. Interessanterweise finden sich deutliche Effekte gerade bei scheinbar 
einfachen oder überlernten kognitiven Aufgaben, die eine andauernde Aufmerksamkeits-
zuwendung erfordern. Viele Leistungseinbußen und Fehler, von verminderter Effizienz bis zu 
katastrophalen Unfällen, lassen sich besonders bei monotonen und kognitiv wenig heraus-
fordernden Aufgaben auf Daueraufmerksamkeitsdefizite zurückführen. 
Ein klassisches Paradigma, mit dem die Daueraufmerksamkeitsleistung bei gleichzeitig 
minimalen kognitiven Anforderungen untersucht wird, sind Einfachreaktionsaufgaben. Bei 
diesen soll schnellstmöglich auf vorbestimmte Reize reagiert werden, wobei die Entdeckung 
eines Reizes stets dieselbe Reaktion erfordert. Die einzige Unbekannte in diesem Paradigma 
ist der genaue Zeitpunkt des Auftretens der Reize. Die Herstellung und Aufrechterhaltung 
einer hohen Reaktionsbereitschaft in solchen Aufgaben wird als „Alertness“ bezeichnet. 
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich zum einen mit den kognitiv-energetischen Mechanismen, die zu 
einer hohen Alertness beitragen bzw. ihre Abnahme über die Zeit bedingen, zum anderen mit 
der neurobiologischen Grundlage der Alertness-Regulation. 
Die erste Studie untersuchte in drei 25-minütigen Einfachreaktionsaufgaben, die via 
Manipulation der Stimulussalienz unterschiedlich hohe Anforderungen an die 
Aufmerksamkeit stellten, ob Leistungsseinbußen über die Zeit eher mit einem zunehmenden 
Abschweifen des Aufmerksamkeitsfokus (Distraktionshypothese) oder mit einer Erschöpfung 
attentionaler Ressourcen (Ermüdungshypothese) zu erklären sind. Die erhobenen Verhaltens- 
und Fragebogendaten sprachen überwiegend für letztere Erklärung, da Leistungseinbußen 
und subjektive Erschöpfung bei höheren Aufmerksamkeitsanforderungen stärker anstiegen. 
Die Zunahme selbstberichteter aufgabenirrelevanter Kognitionen über die Zeit lieferte aber 
auch einen Beleg für die Distraktionshypothese. Basierend auf diesen Befunden wird ein 
Ansatz entwickelt, der beide Erklärungen in einem hierarchischen Selbstregulationsmodell 
vereint. 
Die zweite Studie ging der Frage nach, inwieweit Mechanismen der zeitlichen 
Vorbereitung unter Unsicherheit, die zu einer optimalen Effizienz in Einfach-
reaktionsaufgaben beitragen, bei Daueranforderung ermüden. In einer 50-minütigen 
Einfachreaktionsaufgabe fand sich eine typische allgemeine Reaktionszeitverlangsamung 
 über die Zeit, aber keine Veränderung in Parametern der zeitlichen Vorbereitung (d. h. im so 
genannten variablen sowie sequentiellen Vorperiodeneffekt). Das lässt zum einen den 
Schluss zu, dass kognitive Prozesse der zeitlichen Vorbereitung nicht wesentlich zum 
Leistungsabfall über die Zeit beitragen, und zum anderen, dass der zeitlichen Vorbereitung 
unter Unsicherheit zumindest teilweise unbewusste, wenig ermüdbare Prozesse (z. B. 
assoziatives Lernen) unterliegen. 
Die dritte Studie beschäftigte sich mit der Frage, welches Netzwerk im Gehirn der 
Alertness-Regulation zugrunde liegt – und zwar unabhängig von der Sinnesmodalität der 
Reize. Die kernspintomographische Messung der Hirnaktivität bei der Bearbeitung von 
Einfachreaktionsaufgaben mit auditiven, taktilen oder visuellen Reaktionssignalen ergab 
übereinstimmend ein Netzwerk aus vorwiegend rechtshemisphärischen kortikalen Arealen 
sowie mesenzephalen und zerebellären Strukturen. Dies belegt die Modalitätsunabhängigkeit 
früherer Befunde aus positronenemissionstomographischen Studien und zeigt, dass die 
bisherigen Erkenntnisse auch auf taktile Reize generalisierbar sind. 
Insgesamt zeigt die Arbeit, dass verschiedene – ermüdbare wie nicht ermüdbare – 
kognitive Prozesse zur Aufrechterhaltung einer hohen Reaktionsbereitschaft beitragen, die 
von einem umfangreichen supramodalen zerebralen Netzwerk geleistet werden. 
Weiterführend stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit das Konstrukt „Alertness“ in sinnvolle 
Subkomponenten zerlegt werden könnte, um für diagnostische Fragestellungen einen höheren 
Differenzierungsgrad zu erreichen. 
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1.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Theoretical Background 
 
The ability to remain attentive to sensory information over extended periods of time is 
crucial for many everyday behaviours, such as talking with other people or reading a book. 
During time-critical interactions with machines, it can even become vital. In a review paper 
on sustained attention, Ian Robertson (2003) relates two catastrophic traffic accidents. One 
involved a train driver who missed a critical stop signal, which caused a devastating train 
crash; the other one involved a sleep-deprived, tired driver whose car plunged from the 
motorway down onto a railroad track and caused the derailment of a train, which 
subsequently smashed into another train and killed several people. Common to both accidents 
is their occurrence during the prolonged performance of routine behaviours that require the 
continuous maintenance of attention. In these cases, a single lapse of attention had disastrous 
consequences. Research shows that such failures in sustaining attention are the most common 
cause of accidents on railways (Edkins & Pollock, 1997). In the second case, driver fatigue 
has certainly contributed to the fatal incident, and according to Wickens, Gordon and Liu 
(1998, p. 397), fatigue is estimated to be a causal factor in about 200,000 car accidents per 
year. 
These incidents are forceful examples for the influence of “energetic” factors on human 
cognition (cf. Hockey, Coles & Gaillard, 1986; van der Molen, 1996). They show that in 
states of boredom, fatigue or sleepiness the efficiency of information processing can 
deteriorate substantially. Strangely, modern cognitive psychology has been predominantly 
concerned with the “computational” side, or architecture, of information processing. The 
above examples, however, add to existing evidence which demonstrates that energetic 
variables cannot be ignored when aiming to explain human performance and its failures (e.g. 
Berlyne, 1960; Broadbent, 1971; Eysenck, 1982; Hockey, Gaillard & Coles, 1986; 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Kahneman, 1973; Matthews, Davies, Westerman & Stammers, 
2000; Pfaff, 2006; Sanders, 1983, 1998). Many insights into interactions between computa-
tional and energetic aspects of human behaviour have also been gained from research in 
applied areas like clinical neuropsychology or human factors, which aim to understand how 
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cognition is influenced by pathologies or environmental stressors that affect energetic 
mechanisms.  
One link between computational and energetic aspects of human performance is 
provided by attention, which modulates and biases computational processes by mediating 
motivational forces and overcoming energetic obstacles like fatigue in order to reach 
behavioural goals (cf. H. A. Simon, 1994). A basic attentional function is to establish a level 
of alertness that is sufficient for task performance. Alertness, sometimes referred to as 
“vigilant attention,” “attentional state” or “attentiveness,” has been defined as the readiness to 
respond to external signals (Posner, 1978). As such, alertness represents a basic intensity 
aspect of attention, in contrast to attentional selectivity aspects such as orienting, focusing or 
dividing attention (Sturm, 2003; van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). The concept has been 
further differentiated into phasic, tonic and intrinsic alertness (Sturm et al., 1999; Sturm & 
Willmes, 2001). Accordingly, phasic alertness refers to short-term response readiness 
following a warning signal, with peak readiness only lasting for time periods in the 
millisecond range. Tonic alertness refers to states of alertness that change slowly over 
minutes to hours, mainly driven by physiological factors like the circadian rhythm or the 
sleep–wakefulness cycle. Finally, intrinsic alertness refers to voluntary alertness changes 
within the range of seconds to minutes. As such, intrinsic alertness is closely related to what 
Requin, Brener and Ring (1991) called “tonic response preparation.” 
Alertness is typically operationalized as response speed in simple reaction-time (SRT) 
tasks, which require a rapid and invariable response to stimuli presented at random intervals 
over a relatively long time; high speed is taken to reflect a high level of alertness (Buck, 
1966; Posner, 1978; Sturm, 2006; Sturm et al., 1999; Zimmermann & Fimm, 1993). SRT 
tasks are chosen because they constitute one of the most basic input–output translations and, 
thus, pose only relatively little computational processing demands, minimizing variance due 
to irrelevant factors like strategy or practice (e.g. Blatter & Cajochen, 2007; Lim & Dinges, 
2008). Hence, SRT tasks are thought to be especially sensitive to the effects of energetic 
variables that influence the efficiency of information processing. This view was confirmed in 
many studies demonstrating profound effects of energetic variables on SRT performance. 
These variables included sleep deprivation (van Dongen, Maislin, Mullington & Dinges, 
2003), circadian rhythmicity (Wyatt, Ritz-De Cecco, Czeisler & Dijk, 1999), stimulating 
drugs (Wesensten et al., 2002), and time on task (Lisper & Ericsson, 1973).  
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In comparison to energetic variables, however, it is the influence of stimulus 
characteristics on computational processes during SRT performance that has been studied 
much more systematically. In fact, this was a topic since the early days of experimental 
psychology (e.g. Cattell, 1886). For instance, it is well established since long that SRT 
decreases with increasing stimulus size, intensity or duration (see Woodworth, 1938, for an 
early review). Based on these and other findings, several elaborate theories and models have 
been developed to explain the computational mechanisms underlying SRT performance (e.g. 
Miller & Ulrich, 2003; Ollman & Billington, 1972; Raab, 1962; P. L. Smith, 1995).  
For instance, Miller and Ulrich (2003) proposed a race-like model and the principle of 
statistical facilitation (cf. Raab, 1962) to account for the effects of various experimental 
manipulations on mean SRT. In brief, the model assumes that a stimulus reaching the brain 
leads to the parallel activation of a variable number of “grains” (arbitrary neural units) within 
a variable time interval, depending on stimulus characteristics like size, intensity and 
duration. This activation is then transmitted to a decision centre within a variable time 
interval (due to neural noise), and stimulus detection occurs as soon as the number of 
transmitted grain activations satisfies a decision criterion. After detection, a command is sent 
to the motor system to initiate and execute the response. Miller and Ulrich only mentioned in 
passing that changes in energetic factors like arousal or attention were likely to produce 
fluctuations in parameter values of the model. Since energetic factors are not included in the 
model, any intraindividual variability in response speed that might be caused by them is 
considered “noise.”  
However, in keeping with others (e.g. Flehmig, Steinborn, Langner, Scholz & 
Westhoff, 2007; Stuss, Murphy, Binns & Alexander, 2003), we argue that a substantial part 
of this “noise” may be due to the systematic influence of energetic variables. In this thesis, 
we further explore such cognitive-energetic interactions in SRT performance. The thesis 
consists of three studies. Two of them are behavioural studies, the first of which investigated 
energetic mechanisms that may underlie the failure to maintain alertness (i.e. stable SRT 
performance) over extended periods of time. The second study dealt with the question of 
whether cognitive processes of timing and expectancy during an alertness task also 
deteriorate over time. The third study explored the brain systems that enable the endogenous 
maintenance of alertness, with a focus on the influence of stimulus modality. 
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1.2.  Outline of the Research Questions of the Thesis 
 
1.2.1.  Study 1: Fatigue and Mindlessness in Time-Related Alertness Decrements 
For optimal (i.e. consistently fast and correct) SRT performance, attentional and 
cognitive-control processes are necessary (Frith & Done, 1986; Goodrich, Henderson & 
Kennard, 1989). They include the facilitation of task-relevant perceptual, decisional, and 
motor processes as well as the monitoring and adjustment of performance level (Stuss, 
Shallice, Alexander & Picton, 1995). We suggest that attentional control signals can be 
thought of as modulators influencing the parameters of the above-mentioned computational 
model of Miller and Ulrich (2003): the number of grains activated by a given stimulus, the 
time it takes for the activation to occur, and the time it takes for the activation to be 
transmitted to the decision centre. Furthermore, attention may influence where the decision 
criterion is set as well as the time it takes for the motor command to proceed from the 
decision centre to the motor system and for the motor response to be initiated (Los & Schut, 
2008, p. 22; Niemi & Näätänen, 1981, pp. 152-153). Further beneficial top-down control 
processes comprise the inhibition of premature responses and the prevention of distraction, 
which includes suppressing awareness of task-irrelevant thoughts (Goldberg, Harel & 
Malach, 2006) or stimuli (Mennemeier et al., 1994) as well as goal shielding (Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2007).  
As already indicated by the introductory examples, decrements in alertness with time on 
task (TOT) may occur when these top-down control processes are not implemented 
appropriately anymore, either because of insufficient attentional effort or because of a 
misallocation of attentional resources. Therefore, the first study tested whether the decline in 
SRT performance with TOT can be better explained with a depletion of attentional resources 
(i.e. mental fatigue) or with a drifting of the attentional focus away from the task due to 
monotony and boredom (i.e. mindlessness). 
 
1.2.2.  Study 2: Mental Fatigue and Temporal Preparation 
In SRT tasks, all computational processes can potentially be prepared before stimulus 
onset, since there is no uncertainty about the kind of response required. Apart from specific 
preparatory attentional processes that facilitate necessary computations and inhibit irrelevant 
ones (e.g. Jennings & van der Molen, 2005), preparation is also assumed to act in a 
nonspecific way, “energizing” computational processes (e.g. Los & Schut, 2008; Stuss et al., 
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2005; see also Requin et al., 1991). The beneficial effects of preparatory activity on 
performance can be seen when varying the level of preparedness, for instance by 
manipulating the temporal distance between subsequent stimuli. In unwarned SRT tasks, this 
time period is usually termed “interstimulus interval” (ISI), whereas in forewarned SRT 
tasks, the time between warning stimulus and response signal is typically called “foreperiod” 
(FP). To avoid confusion, we will generally refer to both kinds of interval as “foreperiod” (cf. 
Näätänen, 1971). When the FP is fixed within a block of trials and varies between blocks, 
mean reaction time (RT) has been found to be decreasing from FPs of 0 to about 250-300 ms 
and slowly increasing thereafter (e.g. Müller-Gethmann, Ulrich & Rinkenauer, 2003). The 
decrease indicates that it takes some time to reach optimal preparedness, and the increase is 
thought to reflect that optimal preparedness is hard to maintain and dissipates as a result of 
the growing subjective uncertainty about the moment of stimulus occurrence (cf. Los & 
Schut, 2008, p. 22; see also Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). Analogously, it can be assumed that 
performance decrements with TOT occur when optimal preparedness at the moment of 
stimulus occurrence cannot be achieved anymore. Now, the question arises whether or not the 
processes that underlie the timing of preparation contribute to the decline in preparedness 
and, thus, performance. Therefore, employing a variable-FP design, the second study tested 
whether indices of temporal preparation change over time along with global performance 
parameters. 
 
1.2.3.  Study 3: A Supramodal Brain System Subserving Intrinsic Alertness 
Neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies provide evidence that the brain systems 
subserving the endogenous control of alertness and sustained attention are mainly located in 
right-hemisphere prefrontal and parietal areas, anterior cingulate cortex, thalamus, and 
brainstem (see Figure 1; Drummond et al., 2005; Howes & Boller; 1975; Kinomura, Larsson, 
Gulyas & Roland (1996); Lawrence, Ross, Hoffmann, Garavan & Stein, 2003; Lewin et al., 
1996; Pardo, Fox & Raichle, 1991; Paus et al., 1997; Rueckert & Grafman, 1996, 1998; 
Schmidt et al., 2009; Sturm et al., 1999, 2004, 2006; Sturm & Willmes, 2001; Wilkins, 
Shallice & McCarthy, 1987).  
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Figure 1. Brain activity related to visual intrinsic alertness (from Sturm et al., 1999). 
 
Also, neuropsychological research employing RT paradigms with lateralized stimulus 
presentation found evidence for the crucial role of the right hemisphere in maintaining an 
alert state, with healthy participants (Dimond & Beaumont, 1973; Fimm, Willmes & Spijkers, 
2006; Heilman & van den Abell, 1979; Sturm, Reul & Willmes, 1989) as well as split-brain 
patients (Dimond, 1979). So far, however, no study has tested this right-lateralized network’s 
independence of the sensory modality of the stimuli. To answer this question, we used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity during the 
performance of auditory, tactile and visual SRT tasks. Additionally, we included a condition 
in which stimulus modality was unpredictable to test the effect of increased monitoring 
demands. 
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2.  STUDY 1 
 
ENERGETIC EFFECTS OF STIMULUS INTENSITY ON  
PROLONGED SIMPLE REACTION-TIME PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: The final version of this article was subsequently published in Psychological 
Research, 74(5), 2010, pp. 499-512, doi: 10.1007/s00426-010-0275-6. 
(Co-authored with K. Willmes, A. Chatterjee, S. B. Eickhoff and W. Sturm) 
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2.1.  Introduction 
 
Human behaviour is influenced by energetic factors such as fatigue, arousal, effort or 
circadian rhythms, which produce variation in the efficiency of information processing 
(Eysenck, 1982; Hockey, Coles et al., 1986; Sanders, 1983; van der Molen, 1996). Major 
impulses for studying the impact of energetic factors on human cognition have come from 
applied areas like clinical neuropsychology (cf. van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994) or human-
factors research (cf. Hancock & Desmond, 2001). This research revealed problems with 
translating models of cognition devoid of energetic considerations into real-world settings. 
Peter Hancock remarked in 1987: “It is the inability to incorporate these energetic aspects of 
behavior […] into linear processing models that has rendered the latter somewhat sterile and 
potentially misleading when applied simplistically to actual operational systems” (pp. 170-
171).  
An example for this problem is provided by computational models of simple reaction-
time (SRT) performance (e.g. Miller & Ulrich, 2003; Ollman & Billington, 1972; P. L. 
Smith, 1995). In such models, energetic factors are usually considered noise, although many 
studies have demonstrated systematic effects of energetic variables such as sleepiness (van 
Dongen et al., 2003), circadian rhythmicity (Wyatt et al., 1999) or stimulating drugs 
(Wesensten et al., 2002). Indeed, in neuropsychology and sleep-deprivation research, SRT 
tasks are used to measure alertness (also termed psychomotor vigilance; cf. Lim & Dinges, 
2008; Sturm & Willmes, 2001), which is an energetic, nonselective component of attention 
defined as the ability to achieve and maintain the readiness to respond to incoming 
information (Posner, 1978).  
 
2.1.1.  The Resource Theory of Sustained Performance 
Another well-known energetic factor that affects SRT performance is time on task 
(TOT). It has often been reported that SRT slows down over time (e.g. Buck, 1966; 
Gustafson, 1986; Langner, Steinborn, Chatterjee, Sturm & Willmes, in press; Lisper & 
Ericsson, 1973; Lisper, Melin, Sjödén & Fagerström, 1977; Sanders, Wijnen & van Arkel, 
1982; van den Berg & Neely, 2006). The mechanism behind this performance deterioration is 
not fully understood yet, but earlier studies implicated reduced attentional control because of 
mental fatigue. For instance, Lisper, Kjellberg and Melin (1972) used randomly mixed 
auditory stimuli of four intensities in a 2-hour SRT task and reported a general RT increase 
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over time, which was, at least in the longest RT range, significantly larger for near-threshold 
than higher-intensity stimuli. This intensity-dependent effect suggests a specific impairment 
of top-down attentional control, on which the efficient processing of near-threshold stimuli 
presumably relies to a larger extent than the processing of salient, high-intensity stimuli.  
The assumption of fatigue-related decreases in attentional control receives further 
support from a study in which the regularity of the interstimulus interval (ISI) was 
manipulated (constant 7.5 s vs. randomly varied 4-11 s) (Lisper & Törnros, 1974). This study 
revealed a significantly larger RT increase over time in the irregular-ISI than in the regular-
ISI condition. The latter condition should be less demanding for the controlled-attention 
system and thus less fatiguing: during regular ISIs it should be easier to take short breaks 
from sustaining attention and maintaining preparedness, processes which are effortful 
(Gottsdanker, 1975; Näätänen, 1972).  
Which are the mechanisms assumed to underlie the development of mental fatigue 
during prolonged SRT performance? Even seemingly very easy tasks like the speeded 
detection of single predefined stimuli require the top-down control of attention in order to be 
performed optimally (Frith & Done, 1986; Henderson & Dittrich, 1998). Because such 
attentional control processes are transient (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Weissman, Roberts, 
Visscher & Woldorff, 2006; West, 2001), prolonged performance requires a mechanism that 
stabilizes or reactivates these processes to ensure continuous task engagement (Banich et al., 
2000, 2009). This stabilization is an active, effortful process (Mulder, 1986; Posner, Cohen, 
Choate, Hockey, & Maylor, 1984; Sarter, Gehring & Kozak, 2006). Prolonged exertion of 
effort, however, is assumed to deplete limited attentional resources (Grier et al., 2003; Smit, 
Eling & Coenen, 2004; R. A. Wright, Stewart & Barnett, 2008). The result of this resource 
depletion is a state of mental fatigue, which is characterized by a failure to further exert 
appropriate top-down control to maintain a stable allocation of cognitive resources to the task 
at hand (Hockey, 1997; Lorist et al., 2000; Matthews & Desmond, 2002; van der Linden, 
Frese & Meijman, 2003; R. A. Wright et al., 2007). As a consequence, when fatigued, the 
implementation of task-specific cognitive processes cannot be maintained at optimal levels, 
and performance declines. 
These conclusions are supported by studies on vigilance, which typically employ a 
similar paradigm: prolonged go/no-go tasks with many more no-go than go stimuli (see 
Davies & Parasuraman, 1982, for a review). The hallmark of vigilance tasks is a time-related 
performance decrement, just like that observed during prolonged SRT tasks. Analyses based 
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on signal detection theory indicated that the time-related vigilance decrement is due to a 
reduction in perceptual sensitivity, which has been interpreted as a depletion of limited 
attentional resources (Helton & Warm, 2008; Temple et al., 2000; Smit et al., 2004). This 
view is also consistent with the finding that maintaining vigilance poses substantial 
attentional demands and is perceived to be stressful (Grier et al., 2003; Szalma et al., 2004; 
Warm, Parasuraman & Matthews, 2008). 
 
2.1.2.  Mindlessness Theory — A Challenge to the Resource-Depletion Account 
Recently, the explanation of time-related performance decrements in terms of 
attentional resource depletion has been challenged: Robertson and collaborators (Manly, 
Robertson, Galloway & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley & Yiend 
1997) suggested an account that is based on the concept of understimulation, i.e. suboptimal 
levels of workload or cognitive demand. Accordingly, the repetitive nature of typical 
vigilance assignments induces participants to withdraw their attentional effort from the task 
and perform it in an increasingly mindless, routinized manner. Thus, the monotony of the 
situation is assumed to lead to the disengagement of conscious awareness of the task 
(including a preoccupation with task-irrelevant thoughts; Smallwood et al., 2004), resulting in 
a decline of performance (cf. Pattyn, Neyt, Henderickx & Soetens, 2008). 
This mindlessness model of time-related performance decrements during continuous 
tasks is mainly based on studies using the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART). In 
the SART, the go/no-go trial ratio of typical vigilance tasks is inverted: observers have to 
respond as quickly as possible to the majority of the regularly presented stimuli and to 
withhold their response to infrequently interspersed non-targets. This design was chosen to 
promote the rapid routinization of the sensorimotor response over time. In support of the 
model it was found that RT in target trials prior to inhibition failures is decreased compared 
to successful inhibitions, indicating that failures to maintain attention are preceded by periods 
of increased routinization (Dockree et al., 2004; Manly et al., 1999; but see Dockree, Kelly, 
Robertson, Reilly & Foxe, 2005). Further, participants who reported to commit more absent-
minded errors in everyday life also made more errors in the SART (Manly et al., 1999; 
Robertson et al., 1997). Another study reported that occasionally reminding participants of 
the task goal by means of “content-free” auditory cues improved SART performance 
significantly (Manly et al., 2004). Finally, the mindlessness model is also consistent with the 
finding that participants consider vigilance tasks as boring (Scerbo, 1998) and with a study 
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showing that the vigilance decrement is associated with a decrease in task-related effort as 
indexed by physiological measures of sympathetic and parasympathetic tone (Pattyn et al., 
2008). 
 In conclusion, accumulating mental fatigue and growing mindlessness emerge from 
earlier studies as two candidate mechanisms that may be involved in the decrement of 
sustained performance with TOT. Here we investigated the generalizability of both accounts 
by testing which of them might best explain time-related performance decrements in 
prolonged SRT tasks. To this end, we manipulated stimulus intensity and stimulation 
monotony to observe the effect of high versus low stimulus intensity in pure versus mixed 
blocks of trials on the time-related decline in performance. It is well established that SRT is 
longer with lower stimulus intensities (see Nissen, 1977, for a review) or when stimuli of 
different intensities are presented in a randomly mixed manner (see Los, 1996, for a review). 
In the present study, however, we focused on non-cognitive (energetic) effects of stimulus 
intensity and presentation mode. Below we will explain our rationale and predictions in 
detail. 
 
2.1.3.  Experimental Approach and Predictions 
Several lines of research suggest that attentional top-down control processes get 
increasingly more involved with increasing encoding difficulty (i.e. decreasing intensity or 
salience) of the target stimulus: First of all, attention enhances effective stimulus strength 
(Reynolds, Pasternak & Desimone, 2000), which would be most important for speeded 
detection when stimulus intensity is low. Further, in various paradigms used to study the 
interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in the control of attention, stimulus salience 
has been shown to facilitate encoding by driving bottom-up attention — a phenomenon called 
attentional capture (Turatto & Galfano, 2000). These capture effects of highly salient stimuli 
can either support or challenge the top-down control of attention, depending on whether it is 
the target or irrelevant stimuli that are especially attention-grabbing. For instance, visual 
search is much more easily performed when the target is salient; conversely, search is 
substantially slowed by salient distractors (Nothdurft, 2006; Treisman & Gormican, 1988). 
This difference has been interpreted as reflecting the need for top-down attentional control 
when searching for low-salience targets. Furthermore, patients with attentional deficits 
(unilateral neglect) had greater impairments in effortful visual search for nonsalient targets 
than in search for salient ones (Aglioti, Smania, Barbieri & Corbetta, 1997).  
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These findings taken together suggest that the efficient processing of task-relevant low-
salience stimuli puts stronger demands on attentional top-down control processes. Therefore, 
from the perspective of the resource model, low stimulus intensity should lead to a stronger 
depletion of attentional resources over time, thus producing a stronger performance 
decrement over time. In contrast, from the perspective of the mindlessness model, high 
stimulus intensity should induce a steeper vigilance decline over time, since high-intensity 
stimuli are easy to detect and should thus facilitate routinization and promote mindlessness.  
To manipulate the monotony of the situation, which is a pivotal variable in the 
mindlessness model, we varied the presentation mode of the two different stimulus types. In 
two “pure” experimental blocks, only high- or low-intensity stimuli were presented (highly 
monotonous conditions); in a third “mixed” experimental block, stimuli of both intensities 
were presented in a randomly mixed fashion (less monotonous condition). The 
unpredictability of stimulus type on any given trial in the mixed condition objectively reduces 
monotony. Furthermore, it somewhat increases task difficulty (as reflected by the typically 
increased RT compared to non-mixed conditions; cf. Los, 1996), which in turn should 
interfere with routinization and mindlessness. Therefore, from the view of mindlessness 
theory, we would predict that the mixed presentation entails smaller performance decrements 
for high- and low-intensity stimuli alike, as compared to the “pure” conditions. 
In contrast, from the view of resource theory, the mixed presentation should have a 
different effect on responses to high- versus low-intensity stimuli. The time-related increase 
in RT to high-intensity stimuli should be larger under the mixed than under the pure 
condition. This is because the interspersed low-intensity stimuli of the mixed condition pose 
higher demands on the top-down attention system, which, in turn, should lead to a stronger 
resource depletion over time. Conversely, the time-related increase in RT to low-intensity 
stimuli should be smaller under the mixed than under the pure condition. This is because the 
interspersed high-intensity stimuli of the mixed condition pose lower demands on the top-
down attention system, which, in turn, should mitigate the depletion of attentional resources. 
In sum, mindlessness theory predicts main effects of stimulus intensity (i.e. a smaller 
performance decrement with hard-to-detect low-intensity stimuli) and presentation mode (i.e. 
a smaller performance decrement with the less monotonous mixed presentation), whereas 
resource theory predicts no such main effects but a cross-over interaction: the performance 
decrement over time should be smaller under the pure high-intensity than low-intensity 
condition, and under the mixed condition the decrement should worsen for high-intensity 
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stimuli but lessen for low-intensity ones. Additionally, we expected that mean RT, 
irrespective of any time-related changes, should be shorter in high- versus low-intensity trials 
(cf. Nissen, 1977) as well as in pure- versus mixed-presentation trials (cf. Los, 1996). We 
also expected an overadditive interaction between intensity and presentation mode, resulting 
in a larger effect of mixing on low- than on high-intensity stimuli, which, according to 
Sanders (1977), would indicate an effect of immediate arousal that offsets the effect of lower 
stimulus predictability in the mixed-presentation condition (see Los, 1996, for a detailed 
discussion). 
In addition to the SRT task, we used two questionnaires to assess task-related changes 
in subjective state. These self-report measures comprised the Short Questionnaire for Current 
Strain (KAB; Müller & Basler, 1993), a measure of subjective strain, and the Dundee Stress 
State Questionnaire—Short Version (DSSQ-S; Matthews, Emo & Funke, 2005; Matthews et 
al., 2002), which assesses subjective perceptions of task engagement, energetic arousal, 
distress, and worry. Both questionnaires were given before and immediately following the 
tasks. According to the mindlessness model, one would expect that the mixed condition is 
associated with less subjective strain and worry (i.e. task-irrelevant thoughts) and stronger 
self-reported task engagement. In contrast, according to the resource model, one would 
expect that conditions containing low-intensity stimuli induce stronger feelings of strain, and 
conditions containing high-intensity stimuli lead to a smaller decrease in self-reported 
energetic arousal (i.e. perceived mental fatigue). 
 
2.2.  Method 
 
2.2.1.  Participants 
The sample comprised 42 (15 female, 27 male) volunteers, aged 20 to 30 (M = 23.6, SD 
= 2.9) years, who were university students recruited via advertisements on campus. They 
were paid 15 € for their participation. The study was performed in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki; all participants gave their informed 
consent prior to their inclusion in the study. The data of one participant were excluded from 
analysis, since they revealed a continuous, rhythmical response pattern against instructions. 
The majority (n = 38) of the sample was right-handed (as determined with the Edinburgh 
Inventory, Oldfield, 1971), and all participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Self-reports indicated that no-one had slept unusually little the night before or had consumed 
substantial amounts of alcohol the day before or unusual amounts of nicotine or caffeine on 
the day of testing. 
 
2.2.2.  Apparatus and Task 
The experiment was carried out in a dimly lit and quiet room. The task was presented 
via a standard IBM-compatible computer using the software Presentation 10.0 
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA, USA). Participants were seated approximately 
60 cm in front of the computer screen. The task was to respond as fast as possible to a square 
appearing at the centre of the screen. There were large, high-intensity squares (19.85° visual 
angle; 23.9 cd/m²) and small, low-intensity squares (0.96° visual angle; 5.5 cd/m²); the 
background colour was dark-grey (5.0 cd/m²). Participants used an in-house-built optical 
response button for responding to the stimuli with the index finger of their dominant hand. 
The stimuli were presented for 50 ms; the duration of the interstimulus interval varied 
randomly and was sampled from an exponential distribution with a mean of 900 ms plus a 
constant period of 2100 ms. Reaction time was measured as the temporal difference between 
stimulus onset and response. 
 
2.2.3.  Self-Report Measures  
The Short Questionnaire for Current Strain (KAB; Müller & Basler, 1993) was 
administered to assess subjective perceptions of strain and fatigue. This self-report measure 
comprises eight pairs of adjectives on 6-point Likert-type rating scales describing opposite 
endpoints of different strain dimensions (e.g., stressed vs. relaxed; languid vs. fresh). Task-
induced mental fatigue was assessed by comparing the KAB total scores from before and 
after the sessions. 
Subjective state was further assessed by means of four scales of the Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire—Short Version (DSSQ-S; Matthews et al., 2002; Matthews et al., 2005): Task 
Engagement, Energetic Arousal, Distress, and Worry. The DSSQ-S consists of 30 items, 
which assess aspects of arousal, motivation, affect and cognition on 5-point Likert-type rating 
scales. In fact, Energetic Arousal is a subscale of Task Engagement, which we decided to 
report separately, because it captures a facet of subjective state which, according to resource 
theorists, reflects mental fatigue and resource depletion (Matthews et al., 2000). In contrast, 
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other, more cognitive items of the Task Engagement scale assess aspects of self-perceived 
motivation and concentration. The Distress scale comprises items related to tension, negative 
mood, and cognitions of low confidence and control. The Worry scale assesses self-focused 
attention and cognitive interference by task-unrelated thoughts about personal concerns, 
motives and previous experiences. The DSSQ-S was administered before and after the 
session; changes in subjective state were assessed by comparing pre- with post-task scores. 
These data were available from 31 participants only. 
 
2.2.4.  Design and Procedure 
In one part of the experiment, only high-intensity squares were used (“Pure-High” 
condition); in a second part, only low-intensity squares were used (“Pure-Low” condition); in 
a third part, high- and low-intensity squares were presented in a randomly mixed way, 
creating two conditions: a mixed, high-intensity (“Mixed-High”) condition that included all 
trials with high-intensity stimuli, and a mixed, low-intensity (“Mixed-Low”) condition that 
included all trials with low-intensity stimuli. Each of the three parts lasted 25 min; their order 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
Before the task, participants answered a socio-demographic and a handedness 
questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971), a current-state questionnaire asking for health status, alcohol, 
nicotine, and caffeine intake and amount of sleep during the night before, as well as the KAB 
and DSSQ-S. Then, participants received written task instructions, after which the first part of 
the task started, including 10 practice trials at the beginning. Each part was followed by a 
break, which lasted 10-15 min and started by answering the KAB and DSSQ-S to receive 
post-task measures of subjective state. During the breaks, full light was switched on and 
participants were encouraged to move around to minimize transfer effects by providing time 
and distraction to recover from fatigue and decreased arousal.  
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2.3.  Results 
 
2.3.1.  Behavioural Data  
Before analysing the data, half the trials of the Pure conditions were removed to 
approximate the number of trials (and the reliability of RT measures based on them) to the 
level of the Mixed conditions. This was done by randomly dropping one member of a pair of 
successive Pure-condition trials. Mean RT based on all trials and adjusted mean RT based on 
the remaining trials after removal were highly correlated across participants in each of the 
four conditions (all r = .99, p < .001). The trials of each run’s first minute were considered 
practice and were not included in the analysis. Furthermore, trials with RT shorter than 120 
ms (0.15 % on average) were discarded, since they were not considered responses to 
experimental stimuli. Responses more than 550 ms after stimulus onset were coded as errors 
of omission 
The analysis of TOT effects was based on individual mean RT of consecutive 4-min 
time bins1. Group averages for all six time bins of all four conditions are shown in Figure 2. 
Lines of best fit using least-squares estimation were calculated for each participant for the six 
time bins. The slope of the fitted line indicated the overall linear trend of RT over time. This 
strategy enabled us to specifically test linear changes in performance over time (the slope, or 
RT increase function; cf. Helton & Warm, 2008). Since the linear trend only reflects RT 
variance that is explained by the global linear change in RT, the measure is relatively 
insensitive to varying short-term influences on performance (e.g. motivational shifts), which 
would not so much impact the slope of the linear increase function but rather the goodness of 
its fit to the data. Nevertheless, a quadratic term was included in the least-squares fitting 
model to capture nonlinear changes that take a normal or inverted U-shaped form. This way 
we quantified deviations from the linear change of RT like levelling off or even reversing the 
trend towards the end of the task, since such nonlinear changes can have some impact on the 
linear trend measure and might thus artificially inflate or reduce differences between 
experimental conditions. 
 
                                                 
1 All major analyses were repeated based on individual median RT as the dependent variable, which yielded 
comparable results. 
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Figure 2. Mean reaction time (RT) across all six time bins for each condition (see text for further 
explanation). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean adjusted for within-subject designs (cf. 
Cousineau, 2005). Connecting lines between data points were added for illustrative purposes. 
 
The average goodness of fit (as indicated by the coefficient of determination) across 
conditions and participants was M = 0.380 (SD = 0.293) for the linear model and M = 0.565 
(SD = 0.286) for the linear-plus-quadratic model. Repeated-measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) indicated for both models that the goodness of fit did not differ significantly 
between the four conditions [all F(3, 120) < 0.25]. In addition to the linear trend over time, 
we calculated the RT difference between the first and last time bin for each participant (cf. 
Szalma et al., 2006). Although this approach only takes into account performance during two 
of the six time periods (Rogosa, 1995), this measure was taken to provide additional evidence 
for the robustness of our findings. Group averages of individual RT slopes and differences 
between the first and last time bin for all four conditions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1  
Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Performance Change with Time on Task 
Measure of Change Experimental Condition 
 Pure-High Mixed-High Pure-Low Mixed-Low 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Linear RT slope 2.4 (5.5) 4.2 (4.9) 3.8 (5.2) 2.8 (4.3) 
RT difference (ms) 11.2 (27.3) 23.5 (29.1) 19.7 (27.8) 12.4 (23.0) 
Quadratic RT slope -1.3 (2.0) -0.3 (3.2) -0.7 (2.5) -0.1 (2.2) 
Difference in missings (%) 1.0 (2.6) 1.1 (3.9) 0.7 (4.1) 2.4 (8.7) 
 
Note. RT = reaction time. Linear RT slopes of the lines of best fit represent RT increases in ms per 4 min; RT 
difference is the difference in mean RT, Difference in missings the difference in the percentage of trials without 
response, between the last and first time bin, respectively. Generally, positive values reflect increases with time 
on task. For quadratic RT slopes, however, negative values indicate inverted U-shaped trends with time on task. 
 
The relationship between stimulus intensity (high vs. low), presentation mode (pure vs. 
mixed) and performance was tested at the group level with repeated-measures ANOVAs. 
Initial analyses based on mean RT of the first and last time bin (instead of RT slope or 
difference score) revealed significant main effects for stimulus intensity, presentation mode, 
and time on task: RT was significantly shorter for high- intensity vs. low- intensity stimuli 
[F(1, 40) = 458.52, p < .001, partial η² = .92], stimuli presented in pure vs. mixed blocks 
[F(1, 40) = 41.50, p < .001, partial η² = .51], and stimuli presented at the beginning vs. the 
end of each run [F(1, 40) = 43.03, p < .001, partial η² = .52]. The only significant interaction 
was the three-way interaction between stimulus intensity, presentation mode, and time on 
task: F(1, 40) = 8.07, p < .01, partial η² = .17. 
Figure 3 summarizes the main results showing the average RT slopes for all four 
conditions. The ANOVA of RT slopes yielded no significant main effects for stimulus 
intensity or presentation mode but, importantly, a significant crossed interaction between 
both factors [F(1, 40) = 4.68, p < .05, partial η² = .11], resulting in a larger slope for the 
Mixed-High compared to the Pure-High condition but a smaller slope for the Mixed-Low 
compared to the Pure-Low condition (see Table 1). An ANOVA based on individual RT 
differences between the first and last time bin confirmed this pattern of results [F(1, 40) = 
8.07, p < .01, partial η² = .17; see Table 1]. 
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Figure 3. Mean slopes of the lines of best fit across all six time bins, representing reaction-time 
increase with time on task for each condition (see text for details). Error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean adjusted for within-subject designs (cf. Cousineau, 2005). Connecting lines between data 
points were added for illustrative purposes. 
 
Subsequently, simple main effects were tested separately for both high- and low-
intensity stimuli using paired t-tests with p-values adjusted for one-sided testing. The tests 
revealed that the difference in mean RT slopes, which were numerically steeper in the Pure-
Low than the Pure-High condition, did not reach significance [t(40) = -1.15, p = .13]. When 
using mean RT difference scores as dependent variable, the numerical tendency approached 
significance [t(40) = -1.41, p = .08]. Further, the tests revealed that mean RT slopes for high-
intensity stimuli were significantly larger in the mixed- than in the pure-presentation 
condition [t(40) = -1.80, p < .05]; for low-intensity stimuli, the numerical difference in the 
expected direction did not reach significance [t(40) = 0.94, p = .18]. This pattern was 
confirmed when tests were repeated using mean RT difference scores as dependent variable: 
for high-intensity stimuli, a significant difference between mixed- and pure-presentation was 
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found [t(40) = -2.20, p < .05]; for low-intensity stimuli, the expected numerical difference 
approached significance [t(40) = 1.28, p = .10].  
As can be seen in Table 1, all mean quadratic RT slopes have small negative values, 
which indicates a slight inverted U-shaped trend in RT over time across conditions. 
Subjecting the quadratic RT slopes of all four conditions to a repeated-measures ANOVA 
yielded neither significant main effects for stimulus salience [F(1, 40) = 1.18, ns.] or 
presentation mode [F(1, 40) = 3.28, ns.] nor a significant interaction [F(1, 40) = 0.44, ns.]. It 
should be noted, though, that the effect of presentation mode approached significance (p = 
.08, partial η² = .08). 
Potentially confounding effects of condition order were tested by including it as a 
between-subject factor in the ANOVA. Importantly, no significant three-way interaction was 
found between order of condition, stimulus salience, and presentation mode [for RT slopes: 
F(5, 35) = 1.90, ns.; for RT difference scores: F(5, 35) = 1.33, ns.], and the two-way 
interaction between stimulus salience and presentation mode remained essentially unaffected 
[for RT slopes: F(1, 35) = 4.58, p < .05, partial η² = .12; for RT difference scores: F(1, 35) = 
7.71, p < .01, partial η² = .18].  
For testing dependencies between initial response speed and performance change over 
time, we calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between intercept and slope of the fitted 
line and between mean RT of the first time bin and RT difference score separately for each 
condition. Results are shown in Table 2. Correlation coefficients significantly different from 
zero were only found for the Pure-High condition.  
Trials with missing responses were generally rare (Pure-High: 1.7 %; Mixed-High: 1.2 
%; Pure-Low: 3.1 %; Mixed-Low: 3.8 %). Time-related increases in the relative number of 
missings are shown in Table 1. Owing to the relative rarity of missings, we did not calculate 
individual slopes for estimating linear increases in the number of missings over time. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA of the arcsine-transformed percentage of missed trials in the first 
and last time bins of each condition yielded significant main effects for stimulus intensity 
[F(1, 40) = 38.56, p < .001, partial η² = .49) and TOT (F(1, 40) = 9.78, p < .01, partial η² = 
.20). No other effect reached statistical significance. 
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Table 2  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Initial Response Speed and Measures 
of Change of  Response Speed with Time on Task 
Measures Experimental Condition 
 Pure-High Mixed-High Pure-Low Mixed-Low 
Intercept × linear RT 
slope 
 
-.53*
 
.05 
 
-.14 
 
-.22 
Mean RT × RT difference -.49* .07 -.15 -.22 
 
Note. RT = reaction time. Mean RT refers to the first time bin; RT difference refers to the difference between 
the last and first time bin. *Correlations significantly deviating from zero (p < .05). 
 
An additional ANOVA of the data collapsed across time bins (mean RTs: Pure-High = 
236 ms; Mixed-High = 245 ms; Pure-Low = 286; Mixed-Low = 304 ms) confirmed both 
main effects of stimulus intensity [F(1, 40) = 542.08, p < .001, partial η² = .93] and 
presentation mode [F(1, 40) = 38.20, p < .001, partial η² = .49] and also yielded a significant 
interaction [F(1, 40) = 5.05, p < .05, partial η² = .11], showing that the difference in mean RT 
between the mixed- and pure-presentation conditions was larger for low- than for high-
intensity stimuli. 
 
2.3.2.  Questionnaire Data  
The KAB pre- and post-task scores were compared by means of paired t-tests for all 
three sessions. The KAB pre-task score (M = 19.4, SD = 5.4) was significantly lower than 
each post-task score [Pure-High: M = 23.6, SD = 6.2, t(40) = -4.6, p < .001; Pure-Low: M = 
26.6, SD = 8.1, t(40) = -5.8, p < .001; Mixed: M = 26.1, SD = 8.5, t(41) = -5.0, p < .001]. A 
subsequent ANOVA comparing pre- and post-task differences between sessions yielded a 
significant global effect of session [F(2, 80) = 7.1, p = .002, partial η² = .15]. Simple contrasts 
revealed that the pre–post KAB score differences for both the Pure-Low and the Mixed 
sessions were significantly larger than for the Pure-High session [Pure-Low vs. Pure-High 
contrast: F(1, 40) = 14.0, p = .001, partial η² = .26; Mixed vs. Pure-High contrast: F(1, 40) = 
6.1, p = .017, partial η² = .13]. This shows that mental fatigue increased generally with time 
on task, but did more so over the presumably more demanding Pure-Low and Mixed 
conditions compared to the Pure-High condition. 
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Initial multivariate ANOVAs of the four DSSQ-S scale scores yielded a significant 
effect of time of administration (pre- vs. post-task) for the Pure-High session [Pillai’s trace = 
0.64, F(4, 27) = 11.9, p < .001]. Subsequent univariate analyses revealed that Task 
Engagement decreased significantly [F(1, 30) = 45.6, p < .001, partial η² = .60] from pre-task 
(M = 20.7, SD = 3.9) to post-task (M = 14.2, SD = 5.9). Not surprisingly, there also was a 
significant decrease in Energetic Arousal [pre-task: M = 7.9, SD = 1.9; post-task: M = 5.3, SD 
= 3.2; F(1, 30) = 35.7, p < .001, partial η² = .54]. At the same time, we found a significant 
increase in Distress [pre-task: M = 7.9, SD = 3.2; post-task: M = 9.6, SD = 3.6; F(1, 30) = 4.9, 
p = .035, partial η² = .14] and Worry [pre-task: M = 9.4, SD = 5.4; post-task: M = 12.4, SD = 
5.9; F(1, 30) = 5.5, p = .026, partial η² = .16].  
For the Pure-Low session, the pattern of state change was similar: the multivariate 
analysis indicated a global effect of time of administration [Pillai’s trace = 0.81, F(4, 27) = 
29.3, p < .001]. Also, Task Engagement again decreased over time [pre-task: M = 20.7, SD = 
3.9; post-task: M = 12.8, SD = 2.8; F(1, 30) = 98.9, p < .001, partial η² = .77]; Energetic 
Arousal decreased as well [pre-task: M = 7.9, SD = 1.9; post-task: M = 3.9, SD = 2.4; F(1, 30) 
= 92.8, p < .001, partial η² = .76]; and again, the Distress score increased [pre-task: M = 7.9, 
SD = 3.2; post-task: M = 9.7, SD = 2.9; F(1, 30) = 4.7, p = .038, partial η² = .14]. The modest 
increase in the Worry score [pre-task: M = 9.4, SD = 5.4; post-task: M = 10.6, SD = 6.2] did 
not reach significance, however [F(1, 30) = 1.1, p = .297, partial η² = .04].  
Finally, a slightly different pattern was found for the Mixed session [Pillai’s trace = 
0.73, F(4, 27) = 18.2, p < .001]. Here again, both Task Engagement [pre-task: M = 20.7, SD = 
3.9; post-task: M = 13.2, SD = 5.8; F(1, 30) = 46.0, p < .001, partial η² = .61] and Energetic 
Arousal [pre-task: M = 7.9, SD = 1.9; post-task: M = 4.9, SD = 3.2; F(1, 30) = 26.0, p < .001, 
partial η² = .46] decreased. The numerical increase in the Distress score, however, failed 
significance [pre-task: M = 7.9, SD = 3.2; post-task: M = 9.4, SD = 3.7; F(1, 30) = 2.8, p = 
.102, partial η² = .09], whereas the Worry score increased significantly [pre-task: M = 9.4, SD 
= 5.4; post-task: M = 13.0, SD = 5.9; F(1, 30) = 6.0, p = .005, partial η² = .24]. 
Subsequent ANOVAs comparing the size of the time-related state changes (pre–post 
differences) between the three sessions for each of the four DSSQ-S scales yielded an overall 
effect of session only for Energetic Arousal [F(2, 60) = 3.6, p = .035, partial η² = .11] and 
Worry [F(2, 60) = 4.0, p = .023, partial η² = .12]. Time-related changes in Task Engagement 
and Distress scores were not significantly different between sessions (all Fs < 1). Simple 
contrasts revealed that the pre–post decrease in the Energetic Arousal score during the Pure-
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Low session was significantly larger than during the Pure-High session [F(1, 30) = 5.8, p = 
.023, partial η² = .16] and tended to be larger than during the Mixed session [F(1, 30) = 3.7, p 
= .064, partial η² = .11]. Energetic Arousal decreases during Mixed and Pure-High sessions 
did not differ significantly (F < 1). Furthermore, simple contrasts showed that the increase in 
the Worry score during the Pure-Low session was significantly smaller than during the Mixed 
session [F(1, 30) = 9.3, p = .005, partial η² = .24] and tended to be smaller than during the 
Pure-High session [F(1, 30) = 3.2, p = .082, partial η² = .10]. Worry score increases during 
Mixed and Pure-High sessions did not differ significantly (F < 1). 
 
2.4.  Discussion 
 
Our results revealed a significant overall increase in mean RT with TOT in three 25-
min continuous visual SRT tasks, confirming earlier studies (e.g. Lisper & Ericsson, 1973; 
Lisper & Törnros, 1974; Sanders et al., 1982, Exp. 2). Since there was a parallel increase in 
the (overall rather negligible) number of missed responses, this RT increase cannot be 
attributed to a shift of the speed–accuracy trade-off towards higher accuracy, thereby 
sacrificing speed. More importantly, the results corroborated the predictions derived from the 
resource-depletion theory of vigilance (Grier et al., 2003; Helton & Warm, 2008;  Smit et al., 
2004) but not those derived from the mindlessness model of performance decrements during 
sustained attention (Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997): Although the numerically 
larger time-related RT increase for low- compared to high-intensity stimuli in pure 
presentation conditions did not reach significance, it still tended toward the opposite of what 
was predicted based on mindlessness theory. Even stronger support for resource theory 
comes from the cross-over interaction between stimulus intensity and presentation mode: for 
high-intensity stimuli, the time-related RT increase became larger during the mixed 
presentation compared to the pure one, whereas for low-intensity stimuli it became smaller. 
Subsequent comparisons of simple main effects largely confirmed this result. 
Examining potential quadratic trends over time (i.e. RT changes of a U-shaped form) 
revealed that all coefficients had a small negative mean value. This might reflect a slightly 
accelerated RT increase early in the task or a small “final spurt” RT decrease towards the end 
or both. Importantly, the coefficients did not significantly differ between conditions, ruling 
out the possibility that the observed differences in linear RT trend between conditions were 
due to the differential impact of quadratic changes. This also disconfirms the visual 
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impression (cf. Figure 2) that the difference between Pure- and Mixed-High conditions is 
mainly driven by the stabilization of RT during the last eight minutes of the Pure-High 
condition.  
The significant changes in subjective-state measures indicate that our TOT 
manipulation was successful in producing mental fatigue, broadly supporting resource theory. 
The overall increase in the KAB score demonstrates that our cognitively little demanding 
SRT task elicited perceived strain over time. This is consistent with a previous study that 
used a forewarned SRT task (Langner et al., in press). It also corresponds to the results of a 
study which reported elevated levels of subjective strain after performing a very simple, 
monotonous simulated driving task in combination with a highly compatible choice RT task 
over 25 min (Fischer, Langner, Birbaumer & Brocke, 2008). Further, the larger increase in 
the KAB score during the Pure-Low and Mixed sessions compared to the Pure-High session 
shows that the former were perceived to induce more strain (i.e. mental fatigue) over time 
than the latter. We argue that this finding supports the assumption of resource theory that 
both sessions containing hard-to-detect low-intensity stimuli (i.e. the Pure-Low and Mixed 
sessions) require more top-down attentional control and, thus, induce more resource depletion 
and feelings of strain. 
The DSSQ-S findings largely match those of previous studies assessing subjective-state 
changes during prolonged SRT or vigilance tasks using the long or short version of the DSSQ 
(Helton & Warm, 2008; Langner et al., in press; Szalma et al., 2004; Temple et al., 2000): 
Participants reported feeling less energetically aroused after the session than before its start, 
and task engagement was perceived to be higher before the session than at its end. Both 
effects agree well with the resource-depletion account. The elevation of self-reported distress 
is consistent with studies demonstrating that participants perceive prolonged monotonous RT 
tasks as stressful (Hancock & Warm, 1989; Langner et al., in press; Szalma et al., 2004). 
Only the increase in self-reported worry (i.e. task-unrelated thoughts) is at odds with findings 
from previous vigilance studies, which either reported no increase (Szalma et al., 2004) or a 
decrease (Helton & Warm, 2008; Temple et al., 2000) in such interfering task-irrelevant 
cognitions. Their significant increase over time in this study is evidence for “absent-
mindedness” during performance, i.e. mindlessness theory. The difference compared to 
previous findings might be related to the higher cognitive demands of the vigilance tasks used 
previously, which required not only stimulus detection but also stimulus discrimination, 
possibly preventing mind-wandering more than the easier SRT tasks do. Alternatively, the 
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difference might also be related to using the short version of the DSSQ and associated 
differences in item content in our study (cf. Matthews et al., 2005).  
Apart from these global changes in subjective state, two significant differences between 
the sessions emerged: First, energetic arousal was perceived to decrease more strongly during 
the Pure-Low session than during both the Pure-High and Mixed sessions, although the latter 
difference just failed significance. This pattern indicates that our intensity manipulation had a 
modest effect on perceived energetic arousal, such that arousal was reported to be somewhat 
lower when no high-intensity stimuli were present, that is, when attentional demand was 
constantly high. Second, task-unrelated thoughts were reported to have increased less during 
the Pure-Low session than during both the Pure-High or Mixed sessions, although the former 
difference just failed significance. This pattern of results is neither fully consistent with 
mindlessness nor with resource theory. The easier of the two highly monotonous conditions 
(i.e. Pure-High), which should promote routinization and mindlessness more than the more 
difficult Pure-Low condition, indeed showed a tendency for a larger increase in perceived 
absent-mindedness. The report of less task-irrelevant thoughts during the highly monotonous 
Pure-Low session than during the objectively less monotonous Mixed session may appear at 
odds with mindlessness theory, but this finding might be due to an overcompensation of the 
mindlessness-promoting effect of monotony by the mindlessness-preventing effect of 
attentional demand. This demand was objectively higher during the Pure-Low condition, 
which contained only hard-to-detect low-intensity stimuli. In conflict with mindlessness 
theory, however, is the absence of any difference in self-reported task-irrelevant thoughts 
between the highly monotonous, easy Pure-High and the objectively less monotonous and 
more difficult Mixed session, since the former condition should definitely promote more 
routinization and mind-wandering.  
All data taken together, we argue that the steeper RT increase in Mixed-High compared 
to Pure-High trials is attributable to the resource-demanding effect of the interspersed hard-
to-detect low-intensity stimuli. Alternatively, it might be argued that this difference may be 
due to the lower stimulation level in the Mixed-High condition, since there obviously were 
only half as many more arousing high-intensity stimuli compared to the Pure-High condition. 
However, the immediate-arousal effect of the high-intensity stimuli (cf. Sanders, 1977) would 
probably have offset any of these subtler context effects present at the time of the response. 
Also, the unpredictability of stimulus type in the mixed condition is a source of arousal itself, 
which additionally counteracts the smaller stimulation effect in the mixed condition (see 
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Berlyne, 1960, or Pfaff, 2006, for detailed discussions of the relationship between uncertainty 
and arousal).  
In a similar vein we argue that the smaller RT increase in Mixed-Low compared to 
Pure-Low trials is attributable to the resource-saving effect of the interspersed easy-to-detect 
high-intensity stimuli. Although the higher initial RT levels in the Mixed-Low compared to 
the Pure-Low condition might also suggest a regression-to-the-mean artefact as a possible 
cause for the smaller RT increase in the Mixed-Low condition, this explanation can be 
excluded, since initial RT scores were not inversely correlated with measures of performance 
change (Rogosa & Willett, 1985). In sum, the pattern of our results provides strong evidence 
in favour of the resource-depletion model as an explanation of the performance decline 
during continuous SRT tasks. Nevertheless, some of the self-report data also attest to an 
increase in task-unrelated thoughts (i.e. mindlessness) during sustained SRT performance. 
 The interpretation of our results in terms of resource theory agrees well with research 
on vigilance, which demonstrated that conditions placing higher demands on attention (e.g. 
high event rates or degraded stimuli) lead to stronger performance decrements over time 
(Parasuraman, 1979; Nuechterlein, Parasuraman & Jiang, 1983; Smit et al., 2004). A meta-
analysis (See et al., 1995) confirmed that the likelihood of a vigilance decrement increases 
with task difficulty. Low conspicuity, or salience, of targets turned out to be the strongest 
predictor for a large decrement (see also Helton & Warm, 2008; Temple et al., 2000). The 
study by Temple et al. (2000) also revealed that decreased target salience is associated with 
elevated ratings of perceived workload and distress in comparison to a high-salience 
condition. 
 
2.4.1.  Are Resource Depletion and Mindlessness Related to Each Other? — A 
Conjecture 
The results of our study support the hypothesis that the efficiency of information 
processing even in elementary cognitive tasks gets compromised over time if the continuous 
allocation of attention is required. In line with earlier studies, our data suggest that the 
performance decrement with TOT is related to demands on top-down attentional control. A 
unified explanation of time-related decrements in various cognitive processes that rely on 
top-down control is offered by assuming a limited mental resource that is essential to all these 
control processes but gets depleted with prolonged continuous use. This notion is inspired by 
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recent conceptualizations of self-regulatory strength as a depletable mental resource (R. F. 
Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In fact, efforts to sustain 
attention towards a monotonous task over extended periods of time may be considered a 
prime example of self-regulation. Thus, we propose that prolonged effortful attention leads to 
reduced self-regulatory power, which we consider a hallmark of mental fatigue.  
Can this proposal also help to explain findings that support mindlessness theory? After 
all, there is good evidence for either model in the literature. In fact, even though our results 
strongly argue for the resource-depletion model, they do not completely refute mindlessness 
theory, since it may still be argued that our manipulations were not strong enough to elicit 
reliable differences in the processes deemed relevant in the mindlessness model. The self-
reported increase in task-irrelevant thoughts in our study provides some support for 
mindlessness theory, too. Of course, different findings in different studies can always be 
explained away by more or less subtle methodological differences. This provides an easy but 
often unsatisfactory solution. We argue instead that both theories are not so contradictory 
after all, but rather complementary. That is to say, both phenomena, mental fatigue and 
mindlessness, are associated with sustained performance and can explain certain aspects of 
performance decline over time.  
We suggest that our above assumption that reduced self-regulatory power underlies the 
failure to maintain optimal performance via destabilizing cognitive control helps to reconcile 
the two theoretical positions. Their seeming contradiction dissolves when adopting the self-
regulation perspective, from which both phenomena can be explained as consequences of the 
decrease in self-control strength with TOT: On the one hand, reduced self-control strength 
presumably results in diminished goal maintenance, leading to “absent-mindedness.” Recent 
research indicates that goal maintenance may be especially challenged under “simple” task 
conditions without interference, conflict or dual-task demands, as is characteristic of SRT 
tasks (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Goschke & Dreisbach, 2008; Kane & Engle, 2003). There, 
individuals are assumed to need more effortful control to “stay on the job,” which would 
render SRT tasks especially susceptible to reduced self-regulatory power (cf. Walker, Muth, 
Odle-Dusseau, Moore & Pilcher, 2009). These findings also agree with the proposal of 
Hockey (1986) that the vigilance decrement may be at least partially due to difficulties in 
maintaining a specific task set.  
On the other hand, reduced self-control strength presumably results in exerting less 
attentional effort, leading to a diminished efficiency of task-relevant computational processes 
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(cf. Hockey, 1997; Sarter et al., 2006). This conjecture implies a subtle qualitative difference 
in how mindlessness and reduced attentional effort affect performance: the former reflects an 
impaired allocation of attention, whereas the latter reflects a deficit in the intensity of 
allocated attention. Thus, both mind-wandering and the unstable allocation of attentional 
effort may be two sides of the same coin — depletion of self-regulatory power. Further 
research is needed to test this conjecture with different, possibly parametric manipulations of 
attentional demand and independent measures of self-control strength. 
 
2.4.2.  Limitations of the Study 
There might be some potential methodological concerns related to the comparison of 
pure with mixed blocks of trials: For instance, the significantly longer mean RT in mixed 
versus pure conditions could be taken as evidence for increased computational difficulty that 
could possibly entail higher energetic costs, too, as would be reflected in a steeper time-
related RT increase. The potential computational processes underlying this TOT-independent 
mean RT difference (i.e. “mixing costs”) are comprehensively discussed by Los (1996). 
However, regarding energetic modulations reflected in the time-related RT increase, our data 
reveal opposite effects for high- versus low-intensity stimuli in the mixed compared to the 
pure conditions, whereas the assumption of higher energetic costs associated with mixing per 
se would predict an intensity-independent effect of mixing. This provides evidence against 
the assumption of generally increased energetic costs associated with the mixed presentation 
and has implications for theories about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie intensity-
mixing costs in SRT tasks, since this result is more consistent with notions of automatic, 
stimulus-driven processes that pose little attentional demands.  
Further, the different number of stimuli with the same intensity in the pure versus mixed 
conditions might have entailed differential effects of stimulus-specific practice or habituation 
or both. These effects cannot be completely excluded, but the following arguments may show 
that these potential confounds are unlikely to undermine the interpretation of our results: First 
of all, practice and habituation have been previously shown to have no substantial impact on 
prolonged SRT performance (Lim & Dinges, 2008; Lisper & Törnros, 1974). Further, if still 
present to some degree, practice and habituation should work in opposite directions, and their 
small effects may thus cancel each other out or at least diminish each other further. More 
importantly, differential practice and habituation effects between mixed and pure blocks 
could not explain why in the mixed condition the time-related performance decline for low- 
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versus high-intensity stimuli should change in opposite directions compared to the pure 
conditions. Finally, and more generally, these potential confounds are inherent to all blocked-
mixed designs and can only be avoided by introducing other confounds (e.g. presenting twice 
as many trials in the mixed compared to the blocked conditions; see Los, 1996, p. 163, for a 
related discussion). Nevertheless we think that this slight uncertainty does not outweigh the 
potential usefulness of the blocked-mixed design, given that the potential confound is taken 
into consideration. 
A further limitation is the availability of DSSQ-S data for only about three quarters of 
the sample. For the remainder of the sample, the effects of our manipulations on self-reported 
task engagement, energetic arousal, distress and worry can only be assumed to be similar. 
Since all participants were sampled from the same population, this assumption may be 
warranted. 
 
2.4.3.  Conclusions  
Our results largely support the resource-depletion theory of SRT performance decline 
with TOT and disconfirm predictions derived from mindlessness theory: First, the time-
related performance decrement was not smaller (as predicted from mindlessness theory) but 
tended to be larger for attentionally demanding low-intensity stimuli. Second, contrary to the 
prediction from mindlessness theory, the time-related decrement did not become generally 
smaller when stimuli of both intensities were presented in a less monotonous, randomly 
intermixed fashion. Instead, the decrement for high-intensity stimuli worsened when 
attentionally demanding low-intensity stimuli were introduced, whereas the decrement for 
low-intensity stimuli lessened when attentionally undemanding high-intensity stimuli were 
introduced. These effects argue for a model that regards time-related decrements in SRT 
performance as mediated by resource depletion (i.e. mental fatigue), induced by prolonged 
attentional demands. A conjecture that explains both resource depletion and mindlessness as 
consequences of reduced self-regulatory power was suggested but needs empirical testing. 
This conjecture might also apply to other cognitive tasks that show a performance decline 
over time, particularly vigilance tasks and other tasks involving continuous top-down control. 
Taking a more general perspective, our data confirm the significant influence of 
energetic variables on elementary cognitive processes. These results should encourage 
theorists to consider the impact of energetic factors on the behaviour under scrutiny more 
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systematically. In keeping with Hockey, Coles et al. (1986) we maintain that including 
energetic variables in models of human cognition is an important and necessary step towards 
better understanding the workings of the human mind. This approach may also improve 
translating basic research findings into real-world applications, for instance by defining 
energetic boundary conditions for the applicability of cognitive models or including energetic 
factors as model parameters. This appears even more important when considering today’s 
automated world and its job demands, which, in many cases, have moved away from physical 
work towards cognitive tasks like sustained monitoring and decision making.  
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3.  STUDY 2 
 
MENTAL FATIGUE AND TEMPORAL PREPARATION  
IN SIMPLE REACTION-TIME PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: The final version of this article was subsequently published in Acta Psychologica, 
133(1), 2010, pp. 64-72, doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2009.10.001. 
(Co-authored with M. B. Steinborn, A. Chatterjee, W. Sturm and K. Willmes) 
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3.1.  Introduction 
 
Fatigue from prolonged mental work has been found to impair performance in a variety 
of cognitive tasks (e.g. Bills, 1931; Helton & Warm, 2008; Kraepelin, 1902; Lorist et al., 
2000; Sanders & Hoogenboom, 1970). The state of mental fatigue is characterized by the 
inability to allocate sufficient processing resources to the task at hand (Matthews & 
Desmond, 2002; Smit et al., 2004). Frequently, fatigued participants are still able to perform 
highly over-learned, automated tasks, whereas their performance significantly deteriorates 
when tasks require the voluntary allocation (i.e., top-down control) of attention (e.g., 
Boksem, Meijman & Lorist, 2005, 2006; Lorist, Boksem & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Lorist et al., 
2000). Because top-down control processes are transient (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; 
Steinborn, Flehmig, Westhoff & Langner, 2008; Stuss et al., 2003; West, 2001), maintaining 
performance at optimal levels requires a mechanism that stabilizes control and ensures 
continuous task engagement. This stabilization is considered an effortful mechanism 
vulnerable to mental fatigue (e.g., Lorist et al., 2005; Sarter et al., 2006; Smit et al., 2004; R. 
A. Wright et al., 2008).  
Our study examined effects of mental fatigue on speeded performance in a forewarned 
SRT task. Various studies have demonstrated that SRT performance substantially deteriorates 
over time (e.g., Buck, 1966; Lisper & Ericsson, 1973; Lisper, Melin & Sjödén, 1973; Sanders 
et al., 1982; van den Berg & Neely, 2006). It is not yet clear, however, whether this effect 
only results from an overall effect of fatigue on response speed or whether it also involves 
more specific fatigue-related changes in the timing behaviour under temporal uncertainty.      
 
3.1.1.  Strategic Accounts of Temporal Preparation in Variable-Foreperiod Designs 
Preparation enhances performance, for example, by speeding up responses to an 
imperative signal in simple and choice RT tasks (Jennings & van der Molen, 2005). Here, we 
only deal with purely temporal (i.e. nonspecific) preparation, which is based on the temporal 
contingencies between experimental events. In tasks involving nonspecific preparation, 
participants use temporal information to optimise performance by anticipating the imperative 
moment (i.e. the moment of target occurrence) (Coull, 2004). Typically, a warning signal 
(WS) precedes the imperative stimulus (IS), enabling nonspecific preparation for the 
impending IS. This usually improves RT substantially (e.g. Hackley & Valle-Inclan, 2003; 
Los & Schut, 2008).  
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The delay between WS and IS is called foreperiod (FP). When FP duration is variable 
within a block of trials, participants remain uncertain about the exact moment of IS 
occurrence on any given trial and thus cannot exactly synchronize their preparation with IS 
occurrence. In this variable-FP setting, responses are typically found to be relatively slow at 
early imperative moments but to become faster at later imperative moments during the FP 
interval (cf. Los, Knol & Boers, 2001; Niemi & Näätänen, 1981; Woodrow, 1914). This 
phenomenon, termed the variable-FP effect, has been traditionally explained by assuming 
that participants exploit the gradual increase in conditional probability of IS occurrence 
during the FP and transform them into a state of preparation (Niemi & Näätänen, 1981, p. 
137).  
To illustrate this point, consider an RT experiment in which the IS is presented with an 
equal a-priori probability at three imperative moments, say 1000, 3000, or 5000 ms after the 
WS. At the first imperative moment (i.e. 1000 ms after the WS), the probability of IS 
occurrence is 33 % (and 66 % that the IS will be presented later). In trials where the first 
imperative moment is bypassed, the probability that the IS will occur at the next one (i.e. 
3000 ms after the WS) increases to 50 %. When this moment is also bypassed, participants 
will then have full certainty that the IS will be presented at the latest imperative moment (i.e. 
5000 ms after the WS). In this situation, the typical finding is a decrease in RT with 
increasing FP length. That is, the fastest responses in this example occur with FPs of 5000 
ms. The resulting downward-sloping FP–RT function has traditionally been taken to reflect a 
strategic process by which participants convert the objective increase in the conditional 
probability of IS occurrence into a subjective expectation. This strategic account assumes that 
participants actively track the flow of time after the WS and intentionally monitor the 
changing conditional probability to use this information for top-down regulation of their 
preparatory state (e.g. Näätänen & Merisalo, 1977). This top-down control of preparation is 
considered an effortful process since it arises from voluntarily orienting attention to specific 
moments in time after the WS (e.g. Correa, Lupiáñez & Tudela, 2006; Coull, Frith, Büchel & 
Nobre, 2000; Lange, Krämer & Röder, 2006; Nobre, 2001). The degree to which attention is 
directed to a specific time point during the FP is assumed to be directly related to the 
subjective probability (expectancy) of IS occurrence at this time point (e.g. A. A. Baumeister 
& Joubert, 1969; Karlin, 1966). Furthermore, studies have shown that a state of peak 
preparation can hardly be maintained for long, which underscores the importance of exact 
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temporal predictions for being optimally prepared at the right time (e.g. Gottsdanker, 1975; 
Näätänen, 1972). 
This strategic account, however, cannot explain sequential FP effects: Analyses that 
also considered FP length on the previous trial (FPn-1) as a determinant of RT revealed that 
responses are relatively fast when the previous trial’s FP was short but are relatively slow 
when the previous trial’s FP was long. (e.g. Alegria & Delhaye-Rembaux, 1975; Karlin, 
1959; Steinborn, Rolke, Bratzke & Ulrich, 2008, 2009; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; van der 
Lubbe, Los, Jaskowski & Verleger, 2004; Woodrow, 1914). These sequential FP effects are 
usually asymmetric, since RT is more strongly affected in trials with short FPs compared to 
trials with longer FPs, producing a typical FPn-1 × FPn interaction (see Fig. 1). To explain 
these asymmetric sequential FP effects within the traditional account (e.g. Alegria, 1975; 
Drazin, 1961; Klemmer, 1957), it has been argued that individuals expect a repetition of FPn-1 
on the current trial, so that optimal preparedness is reached at the same moment as on the 
preceding trial. If FPn is shorter than FPn-1, then optimal preparedness will not yet have been 
reached at IS occurrence, and RT will be relatively slow. If instead FPn is longer than FPn-1 
and the repetition-expectancy-based moment of optimal preparedness is bypassed without IS 
occurrence, then it is assumed that individuals extend the period of optimal preparedness or 
cyclically re-prepare at later moments. Thus they achieve relatively fast responses in long-
FPn trials even after short-FPn-1 trials (i.e., in non-repetition trials), which accounts for the 
asymmetry in the sequential effects (cf. Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; van der Lubbe et al., 2004, 
for a discussion). This asymmetry, in turn, has the potential to also explain the FPn effect, 
although it is as yet unclear to what extent. The assumption of two different processes for 
explaining the FPn effect and the asymmetric sequential FP effect is, however, a general 
disadvantage of the strategic account. 
 
3.1.2.  The Conditioning Account of Temporal Preparation in Variable-Foreperiod 
Designs 
Los and co-workers (e.g. Los et al., 2001; Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; Los & van den 
Heuvel, 2001) have recently challenged the strategic view by proposing a unified and 
parsimonious account for both effects. They argued that response-related temporal 
preparation is driven by trace conditioning, a nonstrategic process of trial-to-trial associative 
learning that determines preparatory behaviour across subsequent trials (see also Gallistel & 
Gibbon, 2000; Machado, 1997). The conditioning account of temporal preparation maintains 
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that the FPn and the asymmetric FPn-1 effects are two outcomes of one process. Specifically, it 
is assumed that the asymmetry of the sequential effect drives the FPn main effect. That is, the 
FPn-1 × FPn interaction is considered responsible for the negatively accelerating slope of the 
FPn–RT function.  
Thus, the asymmetric FPn-1 × FPn interaction is at the core of the conditioning model, 
and it is explained as follows: In cases where FP is repeated, fast responses occur, because 
responding was just previously reinforced at the same imperative moment. In cases where FP 
alters from long on the preceding trial to short on the current one, slow responses occur, 
because the imperative moment was just previously bypassed. This bypassing without 
response is thought to extinguish previous moment–response associations or at least to reduce 
the strength of their association. Finally, in cases where FP alters from short to long, again 
fast responses occur, because later imperative moments were not just previously bypassed, 
and, thus, their response associations were not extinguished or loosened. As a result, 
responses in trials with the longest FPns are predicted to be consistently fast and not subject to 
sequential effects. In sum, the conditioning account predicts asymmetric sequential FP 
effects, since a long FPn-1 slows RT on a short-FPn trial but not on a long-FPn trial. A short 
FPn-1, however, should not produce any slowing, neither on short- nor on long-FPn trials. 
According to this model, the strength of the association between any given imperative 
moment and a response should increase with increasingly long FPns and should be maximal 
at the latest imperative moment. The strength of this moment–response association is 
assumed to be directly related to the preparatory state at this moment, which, in turn, is 
thought to facilitate responding (Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; Van der Lubbe et al., 2004).  
 
3.1.3.  Present Study 
As mentioned above, mental fatigue from prolonged time on task (TOT) has been 
shown to impair SRT performance. Previous research, however, mainly focussed on effects 
of TOT on overall RT performance. To our knowledge, only one study has investigated TOT 
modulations of FP effects so far: Björklund (1992) reported that RT after long FPns increased 
more over 80 min than did RT after short FPns. Unfortunately, he did not analyse sequential 
FP effects. Here we explored whether TOT-induced mental fatigue affects the complex 
sequential dependencies within RT patterns, which are typical of temporal preparation in 
variable-FP designs. Based on the premises (1) that TOT-induced mental fatigue mainly 
impairs tasks involving top-down attentional control, (2) that the processes underlying 
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temporal preparation according to the strategic view do involve top-down attentional control, 
and (3) that the processes underlying temporal preparation according to the conditioning view 
do not involve top-down attentional control but rather bottom-up learning, we derived the 
following hypothesis: If the typical RT pattern in variable-FP experiments were mainly based 
on strategic, top-down attentional processes, it should suffer from mental fatigue, whereas if 
it were mainly based on trace conditioning, it should remain rather unaffected by fatigue. 
Specifically, from a strategic view of temporal preparation (e.g. Näätänen & Merisalo, 
1977), one would predict that mental fatigue reduces or even eliminates the FPn effect and 
subtly changes the asymmetric sequential FP effect: regarding the FPn effect, a strategic view 
would predict that TOT impairs the ability to increase preparation with an increase of the 
conditional probability of IS occurrence in long-FPn trials, since this requires an effortful 
process of conditional probability monitoring during the FP interval (cf. Vallesi & Shallice, 
2007, for a recent discussion). As a result, RT in long-FPn trials would increase, and the 
typical downward slope of the FPn–RT function would dwindle or even vanish. This 
prediction is consistent with the results of Björklund (1992). Analogously, regarding the 
asymmetry of the sequential FP effect, a strategic view would predict that TOT impairs the 
maintenance or restoration of a prepared state when imperative moments occur later than 
expected (in long-FPn trials following a shorter FPn-1). Further, it can be reasonably assumed 
that the FP-repetition expectancy does not change with TOT, since expecting a repetition 
appears to be the rather effortless default option. In sum, TOT-induced fatigue should 
bereave later imperative moments of their benefit from increased preparation after FP 
repetitions or maintained/restored preparation after shorter FPn-1s, whereas it should spare the 
benefits of a short-FP repetition as well as the costs of an earlier-than-expected imperative 
moment (see Figure 4, Panel C, for an idealized visualization of the predicted outcome 
pattern). In contrast, from the perspective of the trace-conditioning model (Los et al., 2001; 
Los & van den Heuvel, 2001), no significant changes in the RT pattern with TOT would be 
predicted, since the mechanisms assumed to underlie temporal preparation in this model do 
not involve top-down control processes. Instead, the model is solely based on the associative 
learning of temporal contingencies between warning signals and imperative stimuli. 
Accordingly, both the FPn effect and the asymmetry of the sequential FP effect result from 
effortless, automatic processes and should not be affected by fatigue (see Figure 4, Panel B, 
for an idealized visualization of the predicted outcome pattern). 
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Figure 4. Idealized hypothetical effects of time on task on the pattern of response timing in a simple reaction-
time (RT) task with two variable foreperiods (FPs): panel A displays the baseline condition (non-fatigued 
state) at the beginning of the task; panel B displays the RT pattern at the end of the work period (fatigued 
state) as predicted from the conditioning view of temporal preparation; panel C displays the RT pattern at the 
end of the work period (fatigued state) as predicted from the strategic view of temporal preparation (see text 
for details). 
 
To summarize, we investigated whether or not TOT-induced mental fatigue influences 
temporal preparation under time uncertainty. We derived two competing predictions based on 
two different explanations for the RT pattern typically found in variable-FP tasks: The 
traditional, strategic account, assuming top-down guidance of preparation, would predict a 
pronounced TOT-related RT increase at late imperative moments (in long-FPn trials); the 
conditioning account, assuming bottom-up trial-to-trial learning, would predict no such 
interaction with TOT. To test these predictions, we conducted an experiment in which a 
warned SRT task with variable FPs was performed over a time period of about 50 min.  
 
3.2.  Method 
 
3.2.1.  Participants  
Thirty students (24 females and 6 males; mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 3.3) took part in 
the experiment in return for course credits. All participants but one were right-handed and all 
of them had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
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3.2.2.  Apparatus and Stimuli  
The experiment was run in a dimly lit and noise-shielded room. It was controlled via a 
standard personal computer with colour display (19”, 150 Hz refresh rate) and programmed 
in Matlab (The MathWorks, Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997). Participants were seated at a distance of about 60 cm in front of 
the computer screen. A dot (0.5° × 0.5° visual angle) in the middle of the screen served as 
fixation point and was constantly present throughout the experimental session. A 1000-Hz 
tone (70 dB SPL), presented binaurally via headphones, served as WS. The letter “X” (1.14° 
× 0.86° visual angle), displayed in blue (7.1 cd/m2) at the centre of the screen, served as the 
IS.  
 
3.2.3.  Task and Design  
Participants performed a forewarned SRT task and were required to respond as quickly 
as possible to the IS by pressing the right Shift key with their right index finger. A trial 
started with the presentation of the WS for 200 ms, followed by a blank FP interval, after 
which the IS occurred. We used FPs of 1000, 3000 and 5000 ms length, which were 
randomly chosen with equal probability for each trial. The IS was terminated either by 
response or when the response interval expired after 2000 ms. Subsequent trials were 
separated by a constant intertrial interval of 1500 ms. Feedback was given only when the 
response interval had expired without response; then the German phrase “zu langsam” (“too 
slow”) was presented for 300 ms. Participants performed 48 practice trials and 600 
experimental trials, amounting to about 51 minutes of testing time. Reaction time was 
computed as the temporal distance between IS onset and response. We used a 3 × 3 × 3 
within-subject design with the factors time on task (TOT: first 17 min vs. second 17 min vs. 
last 17 min), previous FP length (FPn-1: short vs. medium vs. long) and current FP length 
(FPn: short vs. medium vs. long), and RT as the main dependent measure. 
 
3.2.4.  Self-Report Measures  
Two subjective measures of mental fatigue were available from 15 participants: The 
Short Questionnaire for Current Strain (KAB; Müller & Basler, 1993) was administered 
before and after the experimental session to assess subjective perceptions of strain and 
fatigue. This self-report measure comprises eight pairs of adjectives on 6-point Likert-type 
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rating scales describing opposite endpoints of different strain dimensions (e.g., stressed vs. 
relaxed; languid vs. fresh). Task-induced mental fatigue was assessed by comparing the KAB 
total scores from before and after the session. 
Subjective state was further assessed by means of three scales of the Dundee Stress 
State Questionnaire–Short Version (DSSQ-S; Matthews et al., 2005; Matthews et al., 2002): 
Energetic Arousal, Task Engagement, and Distress. The questionnaire consists of 30 items, 
which assess different facets of mental fatigue on 5-point Likert-type rating scales. The 
DSSQ-S was administered before and after the session; changes in subjective state were 
assessed by comparing pre- with post-task scores. 
 
3.3.  Results 
 
Responses with an RT between 100 and 1000 ms were considered correct and used for 
computing mean RT. Responses slower than 1000 ms (0.3 % on average) were considered 
outliers and discarded from the analysis. Trials with premature responses (button presses 
between WS and IS or earlier than 100 ms after IS onset) were used to compute the 
percentage of anticipatory responses. Trials without response within 2000 ms after IS onset 
were counted as errors of omission. For a more fine-grained description of the overall TOT 
effect on response speed, we averaged individual mean RT of six successive 8.5-min time 
bins (containing 100 trials each), yielding the following values: 312, 331, 334, 332, 332 and 
337 ms. That is, overall RT slowed over time by 25 ms. Note that the statistical analysis of 
TOT effects was based on three successive 17-min time bins (containing 200 trials each). 
Group averages of RT and percentage of anticipatory responses for the three time bins of all 
experimental conditions are depicted in Figure 5. Additionally, group averages including 
standard deviation and standard error of mean RT are given in Table 3. Trials with missing 
responses were extremely rare (0.1 % on average) and were not further analysed.  
 
3.3.1.  Standard RT Analysis  
Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on RT and 
percentage of anticipatory responses. When necessary, the Greenhouse–Geisser correction 
was used to compensate for violations of sphericity. The ANOVA results are listed in Table 
4. As expected, all three factors had significant main effects: RT increased significantly with 
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TOT [F(2, 58) = 8.0, p = .001, partial η2 = 0.22] and FPn-1 length [F(2, 58) = 67.1, p < .001, 
partial η2 = 0.69]; it decreased significantly with FPn length [F(2, 58) = 15.7, p < .001, partial 
η2 = 0.35]. Also, there was the typical asymmetric FPn-1 × FPn interaction [F(4, 116) = 28.7, p 
< .001, partial η2 = 0.49], revealing that the increase in RT after a long FPn-1 trial was greatest 
in short FPn trials. Crucially, there was no interaction of FPn or FPn-1 × FPn with TOT (all F < 
1; see Table 2). There was, however, a significant interaction of FPn-1 with TOT [F(4,116) = 
28.7, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.50]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The effects of time on task (TOT), preceding foreperiod length (FPn-1), and current foreperiod 
length (FPn) on task performance. The upper panels (A, B, C) display the effects on reaction time (RT); the 
lower panels (D, E, F) display the effects on the percentage of anticipatory responses. Connecting lines 
were added for illustrative purposes. 
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Table 3   
Group Averages, Standard Deviations, and Standard Errors of the Mean of Individual Mean 
Reaction Time (in ms) as a Function of Current Foreperiod Length (FPn), Previous 
Foreperiod Length (FPn-1), and Time on Task (Successive 17-min Periods) 
  Time Bin 1 Time Bin 2 Time Bin 3 
Foreperiod  M SD SE M SD SE M SD SE 
Short FPn-1
   Short FPn
   Medium FPn
   Long FPn
  
299  
302 
308 
 
56  
46  
47 
 
4.8 
3.8 
5.2 
 
313  
320 
328 
 
64 
55 
60 
 
5.1 
4.7 
5.3 
 
320  
316 
324 
 
66  
50  
47 
 
6.0 
5.8 
6.5 
             
Medium FPn-1
   Short FPn
   Medium FPn
   Long FPn
  
351 
316 
317 
 
71 
57  
56 
 
7.5 
4.6 
5.0 
 
358 
321 
320 
 
74 
49 
57 
 
6.6 
2.7 
4.3 
 
360 
316 
320 
 
64 
47  
66 
 
5.9 
4.4 
6.0 
             
Long FPn-1
   Short FPn
   Medium FPn
   Long FPn
  
364 
319 
312 
  
70 
47 
52 
 
6.0 
4.0 
4.5 
 
371 
334 
334 
 
83 
55 
55 
 
8.1 
3.9 
5.1 
 
381 
339 
333 
 
77 
47 
51 
 
8.3 
4.8 
4.7 
Note. Standard errors of the mean are adjusted for within-subject designs (cf. Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
3.3.2.  Post-hoc RT Analysis  
Simple post-hoc contrasts were computed for significant TOT-related effects. They 
revealed that the main effect of TOT was mainly driven by a significant RT increase between 
the first and second time bin [F(1, 29) = 12.3, p = .001, partial η2 = 0.30]; the increase 
between the second and third time bin was not significant [F(1, 29) < 1]. Further, the TOT × 
FPn-1 interaction was shown to be driven by a smaller RT increase between time bins 1 and 2 
on trials with a preceding FP of medium length compared to trials with a short preceding FP 
[F(1, 29) = 6.1, p = .019, partial η2 = 0.17] or with a long preceding FP [F(1, 29) = 6.2, p = 
.019, partial η2 = 0.18].  
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Table 4   
Results of the Analyses of Variance for Mean Reaction Time and Percentage of Anticipatory 
Responses  
   Reaction Time  Anticipatory Responses 
 Source dfs F p η2  F p η2
1 TOT 2,58 8.0 .001 0.22  0.3 .780 0.01 
2 FPn-1 2,58 67.1 .000 0.69  3.7 .045 0.11 
3 FPn 2,58 15.7 .000 0.35  1.0 .383 0.03 
4 TOT × FPn-1 4,116 4.1 .009 0.12  1.6 .196 0.05 
5 TOT × FPn 4,116 0.9 .405 0.03  1.7 .176 0.06 
6 FPn-1 × FPn 4,116 28.7 .000 0.49  1.2 .331 0.04 
7 TOT × FPn-1 × FPn 8,232 0.4 .818 0.02  1.6 .178 0.05 
Note. Effect size: partial η2; factors: time on task (TOT: Time Bin 1 vs. Time Bin 2 vs. Time Bin 3); previous 
foreperiod (FPn-1: short vs. medium vs. long); current foreperiod (FPn: short vs. medium vs. long). Effects of 
interest are denoted in grey. 
 
3.3.3.  Extreme-Group Analysis  
To further test whether the non-modulation of the FPn effect or the FPn-1 × FPn 
interaction by TOT is because of an insufficient increase in mental fatigue over time, we 
repeated the ANOVA but only included the participants with the largest performance 
decrement. To this end, we did a median split of the sample according to the individual mean 
RT increase over time (i.e., the difference between mean RT of time bins 1 and 3) and 
selected the 15 participants above the median. For descriptive comparison, we averaged 
individual mean RT of six successive 8.5-min time bins, which yielded: 291, 320, 320, 326, 
325 and 337 ms. That is, in the subsample of strong decrementers, overall RT became slower 
over time by 46 ms. As expected, the ANOVA yielded significant main effects of TOT [F(2, 
28) = 13.7, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.49], FPn [F(2, 28) = 5.7, p = .026, partial η2 = 0.29] and 
FPn-1 [F(2, 28) = 38.2, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.73] as well as the typical FPn-1 × FPn 
interaction [F(2, 28) = 14.0, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.50]. However, the analysis revealed no 
effect of TOT on FPn, FPn-1 or FPn-1 × FPn (all F < 1.1). Thus, the previously found TOT × 
FPn-1 interaction did not show in the subsample (partial η2 = 0.07). The results are depicted in 
Figure 6, which provides additional visual evidence that there is absolutely no TOT effect on 
the latest imperative moment, as would be predicted from the strategic account of temporal 
preparation.    
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Figure 6. Separate results for the 15 participants with the largest overall performance decrement. Effects of 
time on task (TOT), preceding foreperiod length (FPn-1), and current foreperiod length (FPn) on task 
performance, The upper panels (A, B, C) display the effects on reaction time (RT); the lower panels (D, E, F) 
display the effects on the percentage of anticipatory responses. Connecting lines were added for illustrative 
purposes.  
 
 
3.3.4.  Analysis of Anticipatory Responses  
Premature button-presses were generally rare and therefore arcsine-transformed before 
submitting them to an ANOVA. The only significant effect was an increase in the percentage 
of anticipatory responses with increasing length of FPn-1 [F(2, 58) = 3.7, p = .045, partial η2 = 
0.11]. Notably, the analysis did not yield any significant interactions with TOT (all F < 1.8; 
see Table 4 for details). 
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3.3.5.  Subjective Measures  
The questionnaire pre- and post-task scores were compared by means of paired t-tests. 
The KAB score after the session (M = 26.3, SD = 6.1) was significantly higher than before 
the session (M = 20.5, SD = 7.1) [t(14) = -4.4, p = .001]. The analysis of the three DSSQ-S 
scale scores revealed that energetic arousal decreased significantly [t(14) = 3.4, p = .004] 
from pre-task (M = 6.1, SD = 3.2) to post-task (M = 2.9, SD = 2.6). Further, there was a 
significant decrease [t(14) = 4.1, p = .001] in task engagement (pre-task: M = 19.6, SD = 6.2; 
post-task: M = 11.9, SD = 5.5) and a significant increase [t(14) = -4.2, p = .001] in distress 
(pre-task: M = 9.0, SD = 3.5; post-task: M = 13.9, SD = 4.5). 
 
3.4.  Discussion 
 
Our study investigated whether mental fatigue from prolonged work affects temporal 
preparation under time uncertainty in a SRT task. To this end, we examined potential 
interactions of TOT with the effects of the current and previous FPs on RT, using a variable-
FP paradigm with three equiprobable FPs of 1000, 3000 and 5000 ms. The significant 
changes in subjective-state measures indicate that our TOT manipulation was successful in 
producing mental fatigue. The increase in the KAB score demonstrates that the cognitively 
little demanding SRT task elicited perceived strain over the course of the session. This 
corresponds to the results of a previous study, which revealed higher levels of subjective 
strain after performing a monotonous low-demand condition of a simulated driving task 
compared to a high-demand racing condition (Fischer et al., 2008). Our DSSQ-S findings 
match those of previous studies assessing subjective-state changes during vigilance tasks 
using the long version of the DSSQ (Helton & Warm, 2008; Temple et al., 2000). 
Participants reported feeling less energetic after the session than before its start; similarly, 
task engagement was perceived to be higher before the session than at its end. Decreasing 
energetic arousal and decreasing task engagement indicate mental fatigue or resource 
depletion. The elevation of distress is consistent with studies demonstrating that participants 
perceive long-duration monotonous RT tasks as stressful (Hancock & Warm, 1989; Szalma et 
al., 2004). 
As expected, we found a significant slowing of mean RT over the course of 51 min of 
task performance. There were, however, no specific effects of TOT on indices of temporal 
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preparation: neither the effect of FPn nor the asymmetrical FPn-1 × FPn interaction was 
modulated by TOT. It should be noted that the non-significance of the TOT × FPn and TOT × 
FPn-1 × FPn interactions can hardly be explained by a lack of statistical power, since their 
effect sizes were very small (partial η2 = 0.03 and 0.02, respectively). Fig. 2 confirms 
visually that the RT pattern remained about the same over time. An extreme-group analysis, 
which included only the 15 participants with the largest TOT decrement, also did not 
demonstrate any modulation of FP effects by TOT (cf. Fig. 3). Also, the TOT × FPn-1 
interaction found for the whole sample was not present in the subsample of TOT 
decrementers, which suggests that this effect was not due to an increase in mental fatigue. 
This reasoning is supported by the fact that in decrementers a larger RT increase over time 
corresponded to a reduction of this interaction’s effect size (whole sample: partial η2 = 0.12; 
decrementers: partial η2 = 0.07).  
 
3.4.1.  Mental Fatigue Affects Overall Processing Speed but Not Temporal Preparation 
The significant overall RT slowing with TOT replicates previous results (Björklund, 
1992; Lisper et al., 1973, 1977) and provides further evidence for the impact of energetic 
variables on performance efficiency in elementary cognitive tasks. A shift of the speed–
accuracy trade-off towards a stricter criterion can be excluded as an explanation, since no 
concomitant decrease in the number of errors (anticipatory responses or errors of omission) 
was observed. If anything, the number of anticipatory responses tended to increase over time 
(cf. Figure 5). Previous research supports the notion that mental fatigue may be a major cause 
for this performance deterioration (e.g. Boksem et al., 2005; Smit et al., 2004; R. A. Wright et 
al., 2008), but a decrease in arousal may also play a role, especially in highly repetitive, 
monotonous situations like SRT tasks (Dirnberger, Duregger, Lindinger & Lang, 2004). 
Although the effect of TOT on overall RT was modest (i.e., on average ca. 25 ms RT increase 
across six 8.5-min time bins), our study is one of the first to report a clear-cut performance 
decrement in a variable-FP experiment.  
We suggest that the use of a WS may have contributed to the rather small decrement 
with TOT, since a WS may somewhat counteract the time-related performance decline 
typically found in unwarned SRT tasks (cf. Lisper & Ericsson, 1973; Sanders et al., 1982). 
This assumption is supported by earlier studies using a paired-stimulus paradigm (Lisper et 
al., 1973, 1977), which reported a smaller time-related RT increase to the second (and 
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therefore forewarned) stimulus than to the first one of a pair. Lisper et al. (1973) suggested 
that different rates of habituation to the two stimuli of a pair were responsible for their 
differential RT increase, but other explanations are possible as well: For instance, the 
individuals might get some relief from short relaxation pauses that are possible during the 
intertrial interval, that is, the time between response and next WS (cf. Wilkinson, 1990). 
Also, the WS provides additional stimulation that might be beneficial for maintaining arousal 
in monotonous tasks (Hackley et al., 2009). In addition, the WS event might act as a memory 
cue that reactivates the task goal (Steinborn, Rolke et al., 2009).  
In contrast to the overall slowing, temporal preparation (i.e. the effects of FPn or the 
asymmetrical FPn × FPn-1 interaction) was not modulated by TOT. Thus, according to our 
reasoning that only processes relying on top-down control should be affected by mental 
fatigue (see Introduction), the purely additive effect of TOT on performance speed is more 
consistent with the view that temporal preparation under time uncertainty results from a 
bottom-up trace-conditioning process rather than from top-down-guided conditional 
probability monitoring and voluntary temporal (re)orienting. From the perspective of the 
strategic account of temporal preparation, RT would be expected to especially increase at late 
critical moments during the session. Obviously, this was by no means the case in this study. 
According to the trace-conditioning view, FP effects result from trial-to-trial reinforcement or 
extinction of moment–response associations. This learning process generates (and 
continuously updates) representations of temporal contingencies between WS and IS and its 
associated response. We consider this forming of representations an automatic, effortless 
process that does not suffer from a decline of top-down attentional control processes due to 
TOT-induced mental fatigue.  
As mentioned in the introduction, there is one earlier study (Björklund, 1992) that 
reported an interaction between the effects of FP and TOT. This seemingly contradictory 
finding might be related to differences in the FP distribution: Björklund used five different 
FPs (500, 889, 1581, 2812, and 5000 ms). That is, a higher number of different FPs with a 
wider range was used, and FPs were spaced logarithmically rather than symmetrically. All 
these factors might have contributed to Björklund’s finding the typical FP effect on RT only 
for the shorter FPs, which may be due to a relatively less precise time estimation at remote 
critical moments. This, in turn, might have rendered Björklund’s FP distribution sensitive to 
TOT in that the already compromised time estimation at late critical moments became even 
more impaired by fatigue than that at early critical moments. Also, unlike in our study, 
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Björklund used a double-response paradigm to measure movement time between two button 
presses. This more complex motor response probably evokes more preparatory activity, 
which might have somehow interacted with temporal factors and mental fatigue. 
 
3.4.2.  Sources of the Time-Related Response Slowing in SRT Tasks 
One question remains to be answered: What processes in SRT performance are slowed 
by mental fatigue? Although temporal preparation is an integral part of any SRT task, there 
must be distinct subprocesses other than the ones subserving timing aspects that are sensitive 
to mental fatigue. According to our rationale, it should be processes relying on top-down 
control. Hence, the additive RT increase over time could be interpreted as less efficient 
information processing that results from a reduced allocation of attentional resources to task-
relevant cognitive processes. Effortful top-down control is needed to “stay on the job,” that 
is, to maintain attention to the task over time, enabling the efficient processing of task-
relevant information (Sarter et al., 2006; Stuss et al., 2005). Recent models of controlled 
attention argue that it is the cognitively little demanding tasks (in contrast to more 
demanding, intrinsically interesting ones) that most require the active control of attention 
when their performance needs to be sustained over prolonged time. These models have been 
successfully applied to explain the high vulnerability of simple, monotonous tasks to fatigue 
from sleep deprivation (Pilcher, Band, Odle-Dusseau & Muth, 2007; Walker et al., 2009). 
This might similarly apply to the effects of fatigue from prolonged mental work.  
Mental fatigue may affect all stages of information processing that receive modulatory 
top-down input, from stimulus processing to response execution. Of course, this study cannot 
determine the exact locus (or loci) of fatigue effects within a stage model of information 
processing, since this would require additional manipulations. Efficient SRT performance has 
been shown to involve top-down control to facilitate stimulus detection and to specify and 
prepare the response in advance (Frith & Done, 1986; Goodrich et al., 1989; Henderson & 
Dittrich, 1998). It is these top-down modulations that potentially are vulnerable to mental 
fatigue. This notion is supported by studies that examined the effects of mental fatigue on 
preparatory processes in different cognitive tasks. Boksem et al. (2006) reported a TOT-
induced decrease in the amplitude of the contingent negative variation, which is a slow 
cortical potential that globally reflects preparatory activity. Lorist (2008) showed that the 
facilitation of performance by response-related advance information diminished with 
increasing mental fatigue. We interpret these and our findings as indicating that it was not the 
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timing under temporal uncertainty produced by variable FPs but rather the efficiency of 
processing stimulus information and initiating the motor response that was affected by mental 
fatigue. 
To be quite explicit, we propose a dissociation between nonspecific temporal 
preparation and specific, attentionally guided perceptual and motor aspects of preparation, the 
temporal aspect being insensitive, the attentional aspect being sensitive, to mental fatigue. 
Such a dissociation has been suggested before regarding choice RT performance (e.g. Brown 
& Robbins, 1991; Holender & Bertelson, 1975). A crucial question for future research 
concerns how both nonspecific and specific aspects of preparation combine to produce 
efficient processing at the imperative moment. We conjecture that the representational 
strength of different moment–response associations, as determined by previous experiences, 
forms a kind of temporal salience map that is unintentionally used to time the allocation of 
attentional resources to task-specific perceptual and motor processes. This idea is akin to the 
concept of exogenous temporal expectations (cf. Coull & Nobre, 2008). 
 
3.4.3.  Limitations of the Study 
A limitation of our study concerns the modest effect of TOT, which might not have 
been powerful enough to modify FP effects. This argument implies that top-down control 
processes potentially involved in temporal preparation might be less affected by fatigue than 
those processes that led to the observed decrement. This possibility cannot be completely 
ruled out. It is, however, made implausible by the results of the extreme-group analysis which 
showed that there was no modulation of the RT pattern (especially at the latest imperative 
moment), even when the effect of TOT on overall RT was almost twice as large. Future 
studies should test whether stronger fatigue-related decrements (e.g., with longer or 
attentionally more demanding tasks) produce different results. Furthermore, settings that 
encourage top-down strategies in temporal preparation (e.g., the use of explicit temporal cues 
or non-uniform, peaked FP distributions) may be used to contrast the sensitivity to mental 
fatigue of different mechanisms potentially contributing to temporal preparation.  
Apart from the power issue, it cannot be excluded completely that an interaction 
between fatigue and temporal preparation was absent only because it was masked by either of 
two well-known factors opposing the effects of time-related performance decrements: 
practice and compensatory effort. Practice-related masking effects are unlikely, since SRT 
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tasks have been found insensitive to repeated administration, which is why they are a 
favourite tool to assess alertness/fatigue in neuropsychology (Sturm & Willmes, 2001) as 
well as in chronobiological (Blatter & Cajochen, 2007) and sleep-deprivation (Lim & Dinges, 
2008) research. Also, any practice effects that selectively affect temporal preparation would 
imply that, over time, a preparation-related strategy shift occurs from controlled to automatic 
processing, i.e. from intentional, repreparation-based to nonintentional, conditioning-based 
timing behaviour. This may not be impossible but it is improbable, since the main effect of 
both strategies cannot necessarily be assumed to be equal, which it is. A similar reasoning 
applies to potentially counteracting effects of compensatory effort: it seems highly unlikely 
that a time-related increase in effort exertion would selectively affect the timing of 
preparatory behaviour, thereby masking fatigue effects only on indices of temporal 
preparation but not overall RT. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that our study was 
not undertaken to unequivocally “decide” between alternative accounts of temporal 
preparation phenomena. Rather, it was done to contribute a further piece of evidence and to 
broaden the basis for a future evaluation of these phenomena.  
Finally, another limitation is the availability of subjective-state measures for only half 
the sample. For the other half, the subjectively perceived effectiveness of our TOT 
manipulation in producing mental fatigue can only be assumed. Since all participants were 
sampled from the same population, this assumption may be warranted. 
 
3.4.4.  Conclusions  
In sum, we observed that TOT-induced mental fatigue did not influence the pattern of 
response timing in a variable-FP paradigm. Based on our assumption that mental fatigue 
primarily impairs cognitive processes relying on top-down control, we infer that temporal 
preparation under time uncertainty is primarily guided by bottom-up processes such as trace 
conditioning. This provides further support for the conditioning account of temporal 
preparation (Los et al., 2001; Los & van den Heuvel, 2001), generalizing the body of 
evidence to a manipulation of TOT. Future studies should test whether this interpretation 
holds true for manipulations of other energetic variables such as sleep deprivation and 
circadian rhythms. By analysing intertrial sequential effects, we extend previous research on 
TOT-induced mental fatigue, which often only considered effects on overall RT performance. 
In general, the examination of sequential effects may provide a means to gain additional 
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insights into how mental fatigue affects different cognitive processes underlying human 
performance.  
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A SUPRAMODAL BRAIN NETWORK FOR  
THE CONTROL OF ALERTNESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Co-authored with T. Kellermann, S. B. Eickhoff, F. Boers, A. Chatterjee, K. Willmes and 
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4.1.  Introduction 
 
Attention is a mental function that uses modulatory top-down signals to selectively 
prioritize information processing. An important dimension of attention, apart from its 
selectivity, is its intensity, i.e. the strength of its modulatory influence (Spitzer, Desimone & 
Moran, 1988). Here we investigated brain systems that control attentional intensity in 
situations that put little demand on attentional selectivity but still require high levels of 
attentiveness. In keeping with several taxonomies of attentional functions, we refer to this 
nonselective attentiveness as “alertness” (cf., e.g., Posner & Boies 1971; Raz & Buhle 2006; 
Sturm & Willmes, 2001). Alertness has been defined as responsiveness to external 
stimulation (Posner & Boies, 1971; Thiel & Fink, 2007). Short-term (“phasic”) increases in 
alertness after warning cues have been differentiated from “intrinsic” alerting, which refers to 
the voluntary (endogenous) control of response readiness over seconds to minutes without the 
help of cues (Sturm et al., 1999; Sturm & Willmes, 2001). As such, intrinsic alertness is the 
most basic form of sustaining attention. The level of alertness is usually assessed with simple 
stimulus-detection tasks that require an unchanging, speeded response to stimuli that occur at 
unpredictable times.  
Which mechanisms contribute to a self-generated, sustained state of maximal readiness 
in such SRT tasks? First, in these tasks, all perceptual and motor processes can be prepared 
before stimulus onset, since there is no uncertainty about the stimuli and the response they 
require (Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Requin et al., 1991). For sustained readiness, 
maintaining (or repeatedly reactivating) this task-specific preparatory set over time is 
essential. This includes maintaining the relevant stimulus–response mapping, sustained 
sensory anticipation, and maintaining a balance between motor preparation and inhibition to 
avoid premature responding. Second, response speed in SRT tasks with variable interstimulus 
intervals benefits from building implicit temporal expectations based on the temporal 
structure of previous stimuli (Coull & Nobre, 2008; Langner et al., in press). Finally, 
preparation for speeded action is assumed to include the regulation of arousal, which 
determines the general responsiveness of the brain and “energizes” cognitive processes 
(Pfaff, 2006; Sturm et al., 1999; Stuss, 2006). The optimal interplay of these processes should 
result in maximal response readiness (i.e. high alertness). 
Studies in patients suffering from brain damage revealed a dominant role of the right 
hemisphere (RH) in the control of alertness. For instance, Howes and Boller (1975), Ladavas 
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(1987), as well as Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich and Cohen (1987) reported a substantial increase 
in simple visual and auditory RT following RH lesions. However, when testing phasic 
alerting with forewarned SRT tasks, RH patients showed much smaller performance deficits 
(Posner et al., 1987; Tartaglione, Bino, Manzino, Spadavecchia & Favale, 1986). This 
suggests that RH lesions mainly impair the control of intrinsic, and not phasic, alertness. 
The number of brain imaging studies on alertness is rather limited, but their results 
point to a comparable differentiation between brain mechanisms underlying warning-cue-
induced (phasic) versus self-regulated (intrinsic) alertness. For instance, Sturm and 
colleagues (Sturm et al., 1999, 2004) found in two studies with positron emission tomography 
(PET) a predominantly RH network subserving intrinsic alertness. The network included 
right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right inferior 
parietal lobule as well as thalamic and brainstem structures (possibly including the locus 
coeruleus) for both visual and auditory intrinsic alertness tasks. In contrast, studies on phasic 
alerting revealed (additional) left-hemisphere activity: Using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), Sturm and Willmes (2001) reported right and additional left frontal and 
parietal activations in forewarned auditory detection tasks. Bilateral activity was also reported 
in other fMRI studies on phasic alerting (Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum & Posner, 
2005; Konrad et al., 2005; Thiel & Fink, 2007; Thiel, Zilles & Fink, 2004). Mainly left-sided 
activity related to phasic alerting was found in anterior insula, dorsal premotor cortex, and 
superior and inferior parietal cortex in a study by Coull, Nobre and Frith (2001).  
Left-hemisphere activity related to phasic alerting has been explained by increased 
demands on selective attention arising from the need to distinguish warning stimuli from 
imperative ones (cf. Sturm & Willmes, 2001). Recently, Jaffard, Benraiss, Longcamp, Velay 
and Boulinguez (2007) pointed to another confound inherent to phasic-alertness studies that 
present cued and uncued trials in the typical randomly mixed fashion (see, e.g., Fan et al., 
2005; Thiel & Fink, 2007; but see Sturm & Willmes, 2001, for a non-mixed approach): 
According to Jaffard and coworkers, this mixing leads to sustained proactive inhibition to 
prevent erroneous responding to cues, which is only briefly released after the imperative 
stimulus has been identified. The authors showed that this process modulates responses to 
both cued and uncued imperative stimuli. They argued convincingly that relative RT 
improvements in cued trials, which are usually attributed to performance gains from alerting, 
should rather be attributed to inhibition-related performance losses in uncued trials. 
Therefore, results from studies on phasic alerting using composites of randomly intermixed 
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cued and uncued stimuli may be of limited use for answering questions related to the neural 
basis of the control of self-generated (i.e. intrinsic) alertness. 
The modality independence of brain activity related to intrinsic alertness has not been 
tested systematically yet. To our knowledge, there is only one study (Kinomura et al., 1996) 
that tested intrinsic alerting with stimuli of different modalities (visual and tactile) in the 
same participants. This pioneering study had some limitations, though: first, alertness and 
sensorimotor-control tasks were performed by two different and rather small samples (n = 9 
each); second and more importantly, the study focused on subcortical areas only; no cortical 
activity was reported.  
To our knowledge, there is only one other imaging study that investigated the modality 
specificity of alertness-related brain activity (Thiel & Fink, 2007). The authors, however, 
focused on phasic alertness: they contrasted cued with uncued trials of SRT tasks with visual 
or auditory stimuli and found the only modality-independent activity in the posterior part of 
the right superior temporal gyrus. The relevance of this finding for defining a supramodal 
network that controls intrinsic alertness is at least debatable, since it is still unclear to what 
degree short-term, externally triggered increases in alertness can be likened to longer-term, 
self-generated alertness maintenance. Also, according to Jaffard et al.’s (2007) reasoning (see 
above), in tasks with randomly mixed cued and uncued trials as used by Thiel and Fink, brain 
activity related to uncued trials is affected by the sheer presence of unpredictably interspersed 
cued trials. This difference to standard intrinsic-alertness tasks complicates comparisons. 
In conclusion, the question as to the modality independence of brain activity subserving 
alertness still has to be considered open. Our study aimed to test this modality independence 
using auditory, tactile, and visual stimuli in simple, uncued RT tasks performed by the same 
participants. Additionally, we were interested in the effects of increased monitoring demands, 
which were manipulated by introducing a condition in which the modality of the upcoming 
stimulus was unpredictable.  
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4.2.  Method 
 
4.2.1.  Participants  
Twenty (9 female) healthy, right-handed university students (mean age = 24.0 years, SD 
= 3.5) were recruited via advertisements on campus and were paid for their participation in 
the experiment. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the RWTH Aachen 
University Hospital. All participants gave written informed consent before entering the study. 
 
4.2.2.  Tasks and Procedure  
The experiment was run on a standard IBM-compatible computer using the software 
Presentation 10.0 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., www.neurobs.com). The experiment 
comprised four experimental (auditory, tactile, visual, and mixed) and three sensorimotor 
control (auditory, tactile, and visual) conditions. In all experimental conditions, the task was 
to respond as fast as possible to the imperative stimulus by a button press with the right-hand 
index finger. All imperative stimuli were bilaterally presented for 500 ms with a frequency of 
10 Hz (five 50-ms-on/50-ms-off cycles each). In the auditory condition, the imperative 
stimulus was a 1000-Hz sine tone (70 dB), presented binaurally via noise-shielded, MRI-
compatible headphones. The tactile imperative stimulus was generated by the 1-mm 
extension of eight blunt plastic rods (each generating a force of about 5 mN) from two MRI-
compatible Braille stimulators strapped to the inner side of each ring finger’s upper phalanx. 
The visual imperative stimulus consisted of two white squares (5.7° visual angle each) to the 
left and right of a central fixation cross, presented via MRI-compatible goggles. In the mixed 
condition, stimuli of all three modalities were presented in an unpredictably mixed way. The 
interstimulus intervals in all experimental conditions varied randomly between 1350 and 
5100 ms (mean = 2785 ms), sampled from an exponential distribution. 
In the three sensorimotor control conditions (auditory, tactile, and visual), the same 
stimuli were used but were presented continuously throughout. Participants were instructed to 
perceive the stimulation passively and press the response button with their right index finger 
approximately every 2 s in a self-paced manner (cf. Sturm et al., 2004). This was done to 
capture the purely sensory and motor aspects of the experimental conditions. The continuous 
high-rate stimulation was necessary to prevent participants from synchronizing their button 
presses with the stimuli, which would have rendered this task another alertness task (cf. 
Sturm et al., 1999). The button-press rate of about 0.5 Hz was chosen to approximately match 
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the response rate during the experimental tasks and to induce some automaticity in 
responding, thereby minimizing alertness demand. 
All conditions were presented in separate sessions, each consisting of six 20-s task 
blocks and seven 20-s resting-baseline blocks. Each experimental task block contained seven 
imperative stimuli. Throughout all task blocks, a central fixation cross was presented; its 
disappearance indicated the beginning of a baseline block. Toward the end of each baseline 
block (between 1500 and 3500 ms before task-block onset), an auditory 2000-Hz sine tone 
was presented as a warning signal indicating the imminent beginning of the next task block. 
This was done to help participants relax their alertness during the resting blocks. Before each 
session, the type of condition was announced by the experimenter. Condition order was 
chosen at random for each participant. Prior to the experiment, participants were given 10 
practice trials of each experimental condition. 
 
4.2.3.  fMRI Data Acquisition  
Brain imaging data were obtained with a 3-T MRI scanner (Philips Achieva, Philips 
Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) with a SENSE head coil. Participants lay supine in 
the scanner, and their heads were immobilized with cushions to minimize movements. A T1-
weighted structural image was used for anatomical reference (TE = 2.3 ms, TR = 506 ms, flip 
angle = 80º, matrix size = 240 × 240, 32 sagittal slices, voxel size = 0.94 × 1.17 × 4 mm³, 1 
mm gap between slices). Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals were acquired 
using echo-planar imaging (EPI) covering the whole brain in 28 transverse slices parallel to 
the AC/PC line (TE = 32 ms, TR = 2.0 s, flip angle = 80º, SENSE factor = 1.3, matrix size = 
64 × 74, field of view = 192 × 228 mm², voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3.6 mm³, 0.8 mm gap between 
slices, interleaved slice acquisition). During each run, 133 volumes were acquired, preceded 
by seven dummy scans. 
 
4.2.4.  fMRI Data Analysis  
Data were analyzed with the SPM5 software package (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, London) implemented in Matlab 7.2 (The MathWorks, Inc., 
Sherborn, MA, USA). After discarding the dummy scans, all images were realigned to the 
mean image of the first run to correct for movement artifacts. Spatial normalization into 
standard stereotaxic anatomical MNI space was achieved by applying the unified-
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segmentation procedure of SPM5 to the mean EPI of all runs using the segmented structural 
SPM5 template image as tissue probability map and then applying the normalization 
parameters to all EPIs (resliced voxel size: 2 × 2 × 2 mm³). The normalized EPI data were 
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian filter of 8 mm to accommodate interindividual variation 
in brain anatomy. 
The statistical analysis of the data was done according to a block-design approach: The 
expected hemodynamic response for each block was modeled by a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF; Friston et al. 1998). This function was convolved with block onsets 
and durations to create predictors in a general linear model. We also modeled the parametric 
modulation of task-related hemodynamic activity by mean-centered reaction time (mean RT 
of each experimental block). In order to reduce residual variance in the time series (induced, 
e.g., by head movements), a dispersion measure of each volume from the respective mean of 
the time series was entered as covariate of no interest (see Stöcker et al., 2005, for details). 
After correction of the time series for dependent observations according to an autoregressive 
first-order correlation structure, parameter estimates of the HRF regressors were calculated 
from the least-mean-squares fit of the model to the time series. Group analysis was done by 
entering parameter estimates of all 11 regressors of interest (four experimental task 
conditions and their parametric modulations plus three sensorimotor control conditions) into 
a random-effects repeated-measurement analysis of variance (ANOVA). Alertness-related 
activity was analyzed by contrasting activity in experimental task conditions with activity in 
sensorimotor control conditions. Activity differences were considered significant when 
surviving a single-voxel threshold of p < .001 and a cluster-level threshold of p < .05, family-
wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain. 
 
4.3.  Results 
 
4.3.1.  Behavioral Data 
Mean reaction time (standard deviation) was 272 (49) ms in the auditory condition, 274 
(45) ms in the visual condition, 240 (46) ms in the tactile condition, and 313 (52) ms in the 
mixed condition. A repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a significant effect of condition on 
mean RT [F(3, 57) = 30.6, p < .001]. Simple contrasts revealed that this effect was driven by 
both significantly faster responses to tactile stimuli than to auditory ones [F(1, 19) = 19.6, p < 
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.001] and significantly slower responses in the mixed condition than in the visual one [F(1, 
19) = 18.8, p < .001]. The RT values lie in the typical range of SRT tasks, confirming that our 
participants responded as instructed. Also, the longer RT in the mixed condition attests to the 
higher processing load imposed by monitoring three sensory input channels simultaneously. 
  
4.3.2.  Imaging Data 
Baseline contrast. To examine general task-induced activity, we contrasted the main 
effect across all three unimodal experimental conditions against resting-baseline activity (see 
Table A1 and Figure A1 in Appendices A and C). Results were filtered to ensure that voxels 
were included only if their activation during each of the three unimodal conditions was 
stronger than during baseline. Significant task-related activity was found in the left pre- and 
postcentral gyri, posterior motor cingulate cortex (rostral BA 23), middle and posterior 
insula, putamen, and pallidum. Bilateral activity was found in anterior motor cingulate cortex 
[caudal Brodmann area (BA) 24], dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC), supplementary motor 
cortex (SMA; BA 6), anterior insula, inferior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus, temporo-
parietal junction, posterior superior temporal gyrus, middle and inferior occipital cortex, 
thalamus, midbrain (in the vicinity of substantia nigra and red nucleus), pons (in the vicinity 
of locus coeruleus, reticular formation and ventral pontine nuclei), and medial cerebellum 
(vermis and intermediate hemispheres). Right-sided activity was found in inferior frontal 
cortex, pre-SMA, posterior middle temporal gyrus, and anterior cerebellar lobe. 
Relative contrasts. To identify supramodal alertness-related activity, the main effect 
across all three unimodal experimental conditions was contrasted against the main effect 
across all three sensorimotor control conditions, applying a filter to retain only voxels whose 
activation during each single experimental task was stronger than during both baseline and 
their respective sensorimotor control task. Results are presented in Table 5 and Figure 7. The 
analysis revealed significant right-sided activity in the SMA, pre-SMA, dPMC, anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), inferior frontal cortex (pars opercularis and pars triangularis), 
anterior insula, and temporo-parietal junction. Further significant alertness-related activity 
was found in bilateral rostral motor cingulate areas and left medial cerebellum. The cerebellar 
cluster extended into the brainstem (pontine reticular formation). Finally, a subcortical cluster 
comprised activity in bilateral rostrodorsal pons (possibly locus coeruleus) and midbrain 
(vicinity of nucleus ruber, ventral tegmental area, and substantia nigra). 
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Table 5  
Supramodal Alertness-Related Brain Activity  
Clust x, y, z zer/Area -score 
   
Cereb lu /pons (k = 772, p < .001) 
L cere ll -6 -48 -24
R dorsal pons (reticular formation) -3 32 4.34 
L cerebellar i sphere -18 -50 -24
R med  p ion) 6 - 34
   
Medial frontal/cingulate cortex (k = 706, p < .001)  
R supplementary motor area (BA 6) 0 4.60 
R ante r  4 24
L middle cingulate cortex -2   6  34 3.84 
R pre-supplementary motor area (BA 8) 10 6 3.82 
R middle cingulate cortex 34 3.62 
L middle cingulate cortex -6  3.44 
L ante r  -1 30
   
Temporo-parietal junction (k = 593, p < .001)  
R inferior parietal cortex 5 5 22 4.11 
R superior temporal gyrus 50 -4 3.73 
R sup r 56 - 12
   
Precentral gyrus (k = 204, p = .024)  
R dors p 36 -4 46 4.45 
   
Inferior fron  
R infe r 4  4
R anterior insula 39    0 3.70 
   
Midb n 38) 
R substantia nigra 16 - 10 3.85 
R nucleus ruber -1 2 3.74 
R rost o  2 -2 8
L rostrodorsal pons (locus coeruleus) -4 -26 -18 3.46 
L nuc s 2
L ventral tegmental area -4 -16 - 4
el m  
be ar vermis 5.84 
14 4 -
22 -
ntermediate hemi
ial ons (reticular format
4.21 
3.86 
 8  18  5
 38  
 32  4
rio  cingulate cortex 4.01 
 6  -6  
16  32
 24  rio  cingulate cortex 3.40 
0 - 0  
6  14
42  erio  temporal gyrus 3.43 
al remotor cortex (BA 6) 
tal/insular cortex (k = 189, p = .031) 
rio  frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 2  22  
  24
4.15 
rai /brainstem (k = 179, p = .0  
14 -
10 8 -1
8 -1rod rsal pons (locus coeruleus) 3.71 
leu  ruber -6 -20 -1
1
3.37 
3.30 
 
Note. L  l  area. Coordinates x, y, z refer to MNI space; k n
of voxels in cluster; p-value represents cluster-level error probability ected for multiple 
comparisons. 
 = eft; R = right; BA = Brodmann  = umber 
corr
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Figure 7. Supramodal alertness-related brain activity (averaged unim a rtness conditions vs. averaged 
control o  only voxels that show stronger activity duri h unimodal 
experimental condition than resting baseline as well as during each unim experimental condition and its 
respec e control condition). TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; dPMC = d rsal premoto o ; aI/IFC = 
anterior ins supplementary motor area; Ver = cerebellar vermis; ACC 
= anterior cingulate cortex; SN/NR = substantia nigra/nucleus ruber; L = us coeruleus. Parasagittal slices 
show a v ject template brain; coordinates refer to ; color codes 
t-values; vo el-wise p < .001 & FWE-corrected cluster-level p < .05. 
 
Modality-specific alertness-related activity was an by calculating balanced 
contra s 
were masked to include only voxels that showed stronger activity during the experimental 
task condition than during both baseline and their respective sensorimotor control condition. 
The results of these analyses are reported in Figure 8 and Table 6. Generally, modality-
specif a zed in proce ng signals of a given sensory 
modality: Contrasting auditory with somatosensory and visual alertness revealed stronger 
bilate  or aspects of the superior and middle temporal gyri (BAs 41, 42 
and 22; see Figure 8A). These areas correspond to primary and secondary auditory cortices. 
Comparing somatosensory with auditory and visual alertness revealed stronger bilateral 
activi in  gyrus (BAs 1 and 2), parietal opercu , and s ra inal gyrus, 
with activity being more pronounced in the right hemisphere (see Figure 8B). These regions 
correspond to primary (S1), secondary (S2) and higher-order m
contrasting visual with audito tosensory alertness revealed stronger bilateral 
activity in superior, middle, and inferior occipital gyri, fusiform
inferior parietal lobules, and inferior temporal gyrus (see Figure 8C). Additionally, activity 
od l ale
 
odal 
 c nditions, masked to include ng eac
tiv o r c rtex
ula/inferior frontal cortex; pre-SMA = pre-
C  loc
cti ity overlaid over the SPM5 single-sub  MNI space
x
alyzed 
st between one unimodal task condition and the other two conditions. These contrasts 
ic ctivity was found only in areas speciali ssi
ral activity in posteri
ty  the postcentral lum up marg
 so atosensory cortices. Finally, 
 gyrus, caudal superior and 
ry and soma
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was found in right cuneus (BAs 18 and 19) and lingual gyrus. ese regions correspond to 
secon ry on areas of both dorsal d ral visual-
processing streams. 
 Th
the da  and higher-order visual associati an  vent
 
 
Figure 8. (A-C) Modality-specific alertness-related brain activity during the three unimodal conditions (one 
unimodal alertness condition vs. the other two unimodal alertness conditions, respectively; masked to include 
only voxels that show stronger activity during each unimodal experimental condition than resting baseline as 
well as during each unimodal experimental condition and its respective control condition). (D) Alertness-related 
brain activity specific to the unpredictably mixed presentation of stimuli of different modalities (mixed 
condition vs. all three unimodal alertness conditions, masked to include only voxels that show stronger activity 
uring the mixed condition than during baseline as well as during the mixed and each single unimodal 
condit
d
ion). Coronal and parasagittal slices show activity overlaid over the SPM5 single-subject template brain; 
coordinates refer to MNI space; color codes t-values; voxel-wise p<.001 & FWE-corrected cluster-level p<.05. 
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Table 6  
Modality-Specific Alertness-Related Activity  
Cluster/Area x, y, z z-score
   
Auditory Alertness 
Cluster 1 (k = 306, p = .004) 
L posterior superior temporal gyrus -52 -30  8 7.73
L posterior middle temporal gyrus -66 -28  6 7.03
L posterior superior temporal sulcus -54 -30  4 6.38
Cluster 2 (k = 169, p = .047) 
R posterior superior temporal gyrus 62 -26  4 6.50
R posterior middle temporal gyrus 64 -30 -2 4.68
R posterior superior temporal sulcus 50 -30  0 3.57
   
Tactile Alertness 
Cluster 1 (k = 1043, p < .001) 
R Rolandic operculum (S2) 46 -20  16 6.18
R postcentral sulcus (BA 2/5) 44 -36  56 4.72
R supramarginal gyrus 
R postcentral sulcus 
54 -34  48 4.21
(BA 2/40) 44 -26  40 4.09
R postcentral gyrus (BA 1; S1) 32 -42  66 3.86
Cluster 2 (k = 405, p = .001) 
L Rolandic operculum (S2) -54 -18  18 4.22
L postcentral gyrus (BA 2/7) -40 -30  46 3.95
L supramarginal gyrus -56 -28  22 3.85
L postcentral sulcus (BA 2/5) -44 -34  52 3.75
L postcentral sulcus (BA 2/40) -36 -32  40 3.62
   
Visual Alertness 
Cluster 1 (k = 1174, p < .001) 
R middle occipital gyrus 30 -80  24 7.58
R lateral middle occipital gyrus 42 -68  10 6.80
R superior parietal lobule (BA 7A) 26 -60  52 4.35
R superior parietal lobule (BA 7P) 26 -74  48 3.98
R cuneus (BA 19) (V3) 12 -86  28 3.95
R cuneus (BA 18) (V2) 10 -90  24 3.80
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Table 6 (continued) 
Modality-Specific Alertness-Related Activity 
Cluster/Area x, y, z z-score
   
Cluster 2 (k = 995, p < .001) 
L fusiform gyrus -46 -62 -16 6.48
L middle occipital gyrus -38 -80   2 5.64
L inferior occipital gyrus (V4) -30 -86 -12 3.68
L inferior temporal gyrus -56 -52 -16 3.18
Cluster 3 (k = 578, p < .001) 
L middle occipital gyrus -30 -78  20 Inf.
L lateral middle occipital gyrus -44 -72  10 5.22
Cluster 4 (k = 372, p = .001) 
R inferior occipital gyrus 38 -66  -8 5.80
R inferior temporal gyrus 42 -52 -14 4.49
R fusiform gyrus 32 -42 -20 3.32
Cluster 5 (k = 292, p = .005) 
L superior parietal lobule (BA 7A) -26 -64  56 5.38
Cluster 6 (k = 262, p = .008) 
R inferior occipital gyrus 34 -76 -4 5.74
R middle occipital gyrus 40 -80  2 5.60
R lingual gyrus 24 -84 -4 5.23
 
Note. L = left; R = right; BA = Brodmann area. Coordinates x, y, z refer to MNI 
space; k = number of voxels in cluster; p-value represents cluster-level error 
probability corrected for multiple comparisons. 
 
activity in dPMC, precuneus, and posterior aspects of middle and superior temporal gyri, 
. Right-sided activity was found 
in inferior frontal cortex (pars opercularis and pars triangularis), inferior parietal lobule and 
 
Alertness-related activity under increased monitoring demand was examined via a 
balanced contrast between the mixed-modalities condition and all three sensorimotor control 
conditions, using a filter to include only voxels with more activity during the experimental 
task than during baseline. Results are shown in Table A2 and Figure A2 (see Appendices B 
and D). In general, the pattern of results was similar to the supramodal network described 
above but included additional foci of significant activity. The analysis revealed bilateral 
which at the right side extended into inferior parietal cortex
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angular gyrus. Activity in right pre-SMA was found to be slightly above our cluster threshold 
(corrected cluster-level p = .085). Other areas with significant supramodal alertness-related 
activity reported above (right SMA, anterior su a, and AC ; ft medial cerebellum; 
bilate  rain, and brains ) were only active at a lower level 
(unco c
n th n ied in the mixed condition 
and the s rk identified across uni al con o e computed a balanced 
contrast between both, again applying a compos ilter to retain only voxels with more 
activity during the mixed condition than during baseline and each of the three unimodal 
conditions. Only two areas survived this direct test: bilateral precuneus (BA 7; MNI 
coordinates: 4/-56/46; z = 4.15) and left dPMC (BA 6; -28/6/52, z = 4.40; -28/-4/50, z = 3.80; 
see Figure 8D). Conversely, contrasting all thre odal against the mixed condition 
yielde tera n rior medial cerebellum (-8/-50/-6, z = 
4.31; 10/-48/-8, z = 3.99). 
When analyzing modulatory effects of the p etric RT regressors, it turned out that 
blockwise averaged resp ificantly associated with brain activity in any 
of the four experimental task conditions. Thus, m n RT per block appears not to explain any 
additional variance in alertness-related brain activity beyond the task regressors themselves. 
 
.4.  Di s  
 
We examined the influence of stimulus modality on the brain network activated when 
maintaining a highly alert state, that is, high responsiveness to temporally unpredictable 
stimuli. odality independ e vers lity specificity of this 
network by comparing activity in response to auditory, tactile, and visual stimuli. Second, we 
explored the effect of furt onitoring demands by m king stimulus modality 
unpredictable. Our results provide evidence for a mainly right-lateralized supramodal core 
netwo   This n ork, identified across all three sensory 
moda e ntrasted against sensorimotor control conditions), 
consisted of right dPMC, SMA, pre-SMA, ACC, rior fr x, anterior insula, and 
temporo-parietal junction as well as left medial cerebellum, bilateral motor cingulate areas, 
midbr findin genera  reement with previous 
in l C le
ral mid-cingulum, midb tem
rre ted voxel-wise p < .01). 
To directly test for differences betwee
upramodal netwo
e etwork identif
mod
ite f
diti ns, w
e unim
d a significant difference in the bila l a te
aram
onse speed was not sign
ea
4 scu sion
First, we tested the m enc us moda
her increasing m a
rk controlling intrinsic alertness. etw
liti s (alertness conditions co
infe ontal corte
ain, and brainstem areas. These gs are lly in ag
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studies on intrinsic alertness using only one sensor odality (auditory or visual; cf. Sturm et 
al., 1 9 mes, 2001). In the following, we will discuss possible 
contributions of the network’s parts to maintaining an alert st pplementary Material 
for a brief discussion of the results of the baseline contrast). 
 
4.4.1.  Maintaining the Preparatory S Stimulus–Response Mapping, Motor 
Prepa t ature s ses  
Lesion studies in non-human primates (Halsband & Passingham, 1985; Petrides, 1985) 
and human patients (Petrides, 1997) showed that the dPMC is essential for learning and using 
arbitrary stimulus–response associations. Eviden or a crucial role of the dPMC in such 
sensorim  by electr iological recordings in monkeys (Hoshi 
& Tanji, 2006). Dorsal PMC also has a role in p parator processes: Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) revealed dPMC involvement in using cue information for the 
preparatory scaling of grip force (Chouinard, Leonard & Paus, 2005). This area also 
processes information provided by spatial cues to ect mo  regardless of the cue’s 
sensory modality (Weinrich & Wise, 1982). Furt there is electrophysiological evidence 
for se Wise, Boussao , hnson & Caminiti, 1997), and a recent 
fMRI study (Kansaku, Hanakawa, Wu & Hallett, 2004) reported bilateral (more pronounced 
on the right side) dPMC activity when participa attended to auditory, tactile or visual 
stimuli without any response requirement. This was assumed to reflect a role of dPMC in 
facilitating cue detec C is also supported by an fMRI 
study of S. R. Simon et al. (2002), who found increased dPMC activity related to spatial 
attention and memory. Non-motor, detection-related activity in the vicinity of the right dPMC 
was a  y on su d attention, in which participants were 
required to count infrequent somatosensory or vi al targ  ut any overt response 
(Pardo et al., 1991). 
MC has been foun o be directly involved in motor control 
(Geyer, Matelli, Luppino & Zilles, 2000; Graziano, Taylor & Moore, 2002), via direct 
connections to the primary motor area (M1) and the spinal cord (Barbas & Pandya, 1987; 
Dum S e argued that bilateral activa f dPMC in our task vs. 
baseline contrast reflects both (i) maintaining th pping between stimuli and instructed 
motor response (including the facilitation of sti lus detection) and (ii) sending motor-
execu n tor hierarchy. Both functional aspects have been 
y m
99 , 2004; Sturm & Will
ate (see Su
et: 
ra ion, and the Prevention of Prem Re pon
ce f
otor mapping is also provided ophys
re y motor 
 dir
her, 
vements,
nsory functions of dPMC ( ud Jo
nts 
tion. This non-motor function of dPM
lso reported in an earlier PET stud staine
su ets witho
At the same time, dP d t
& trick, 1991). Thus it can b tion o
e ma
mu
tio  signals further down the mo
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proposed to be differentially localized in more rostral vs. caudal subdivisions of dPMC, 
respectively (reviewed in Picard & Strick, 2001, see also Chouinard & Paus, 2006; S. R. 
Simo st shows a som t more rostral focus of 
dPMC ac e right compared to the left side (see Appendix C, Figure A1). This may 
explain why only right dPMC survived the comparison with the sensorimotor control tasks: 
Both p quired peated  button presses, to 
which caudal dPMC may contribute equally in th tasks, resulting in elimination by 
subtraction. Sustained stimulus–response mapping and signal detection, however, were only 
requir  . This diffe t rocess  nd might be preferably 
subserved by the contralateral rostral dPMC. 
A sim rtness-re ral 
movements usually activate bilateral SMA (e.g. Naito et al., 2000), which is supposed to be 
involved in initiating and executing movements (Cunnington Windischberger, Deecke & 
oser, 2003). This notion is supported by recent effective-connectivity studies (Eickhoff et 
al., 2008; Grefkes, Eickhoff, Nowak, Dafotakis & Fink, 2008; Grefkes, Nowak et al., 2008) 
that revealed strong context-specific influences of SMA on M1, promoting ipsilateral and 
suppressing contralateral M1 activity during unilateral hand movements. Picard and Strick 
(1996) suggested that SMA proper is more active in simple, automatic tasks and pre-SMA is 
more active in complex, cognitively controlled ones (cf. Jakobs et al., 2009). Recently it has 
been proposed that functional differences between SMA proper and pre-SMA follow a 
caudal–rostral continuum rather than a discrete parcellation (Nachev, Kennard & Husain, 
2008). This approach is also reflected in another function ascribed to SMA and, to a greater 
extent, pre-SMA: the preparation of movements (Cunnington, Windischberger & Moser, 
2005; Hülsmann, Erb & Grodd, 2003). The role of pre-SMA in voluntary movement 
preparation is also supported by its connectivity pattern in monkeys, where it receives 
afferents from the inferior parietal lobule (Luppino, Matelli, Camarda & Rizzolatti, 1993), 
supplying it with integrated sensory input and motor plans; efferents are predominantly sent 
to dPMC. We argue that maintaining a preparatory set for a given movement is subserved by 
rostral SMA and its anterior continuation, pre-SMA. In contrast, more basic processes related 
to response initiation/execution may be localized more caudally. Since the latter are shared by 
our experimental and control tasks, caudal SMA activity is eliminated by the subtraction of 
activity during sensorimotor control tasks.  
n et al., 2002). In fact, our baseline contra
tivity at th
ewha
ex erimental and control tasks re  the re
 bo
 execution of
ed in the experimental tasks ren ial p ing dema
ilar logic may apply to ale lated right-sided SMA activations. Unilate
M
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The ACC has been found involved in a wealth of motor, cognitive, and affective 
& Vogt, 1995). Motor functions have been 
associated with different cingulate motor zone m g them caudal BA 24, which has been 
found active during simple movements (Picard & Strick, 1996). The stronger activation of 
caudal ACC during intrinsic alerting, compared  o r repetitive m control tasks, might 
reflec  tion that facilitates the generation of motor output. 
This notion is supported by a study showing that ACC activity is closely related to the 
generation of the contingent negative variation, an electrocortical potential indicating top-
down preparatory activity following a warning signal that announces an impending 
imperative stimulus (Nagai et al., 2004).  
i  for a given m otor preparation as well 
as motor inhibition, largely implemented in parallel (Davranche et al., 2007; Duque & Ivry, 
2009; Hasbroucq et al., 1999; Jennings & van der Molen, 2005). Motor preparation results in 
increased readiness to respond in a predefined way upon occurrence of a signal. The resulting 
“urge   in check to prevent premature responding. Also, 
competing action tendencies need be suppressed while preparing for a given motor response 
(Jennings et al. 2009). Here, inhibitory processes come into play, which are presumably 
subserved by pre-SMA and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44). In their review, Picard and 
Strick ant role of pre-SMA in higher motor control including 
motor inhibition. This assumption is corroborated by a patient study showing that lesions in 
pre-SMA and SMA were selectively associated with deficits in response inhibition (Picton et 
al., 2007). Further support comes from a recent experiment using the stop-signal paradigm, in 
which  means of TMS disrupted the ability to suppress 
responses after stop signals (Chen, Muggleton, Tzeng, Hung & Juan, 2009). Since our 
temporally unpredictable experimental condi required a rapid stimulus-contingent 
implementation of motor plans, alertness-related pre-SMA activity may reflect increased 
demands for preparatory motor control to hold motor plans on line for rapid use as well as to 
mediate constraints on excitatory activity to prev t e premature release of motor plans. 
The idence that these constraining sig  may originate from inferior prefrontal 
cortex (BA 44). Lesions in this area were accompanied by disturbed inhibition of initiated 
movements (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian & Robbins, 2003), and TMS over right BA 
44 im ir ct (Cham rs et al., 2006 Similarly, Brass, Derrfuss 
and v   from an R xperim aring the inhibition of 
processes (reviewed in Devinsky, Morrell 
s, a on
to u otor 
t a preparatory attentional modula
Ma ntaining a preparatory set ovement involves m
 to move,” however, must be held
 (1996) argued for an import
 the deactivation of pre-SMA by
tions 
en  th
nalsre is ev
pa ed the ability to stop a motor a be ). 
on Cramon (2005) concluded fM I e ent comp
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imitative and overlearned responses that BA 44 generates stop signals for the control of 
action. It has been suggested (Jakobs et al., 2009) that BA 44 acts as a hold-and-release 
switc rtainty ab t oment of movement execution. Direct 
anatomical connections between pre-SMA and right BA 44 have been shown with diffusion 
tensor tractography (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank & Poldrac
2004), and fMRI revealed common activity of both areas during response inhibition (Coxon, 
Stinear & Byblow, 2009; Xue, Aron & Poldrack, 2008). Further, a recent study (Duann, Ide, 
Luo & Li, 2009) reported substantial effective con ivity b oth regions during stop-
signal performance, with greater connectivity during successful response inhibition. Based on 
these d  that BA 44 modulates pre-SMA activity to bias the 
balance (or permanent conflict) between “going” and “withholding” according to current task 
dema .
 
4.4.2.  The Timing of Preparation  
n consta  predicts futu  events based on previous 
experiences in order to minimize computational load and to disambiguate incoming 
inform een labeled “predictive coding” (Creutzig & Sprekeler, 
2008; Summerfield et al., 2006). Situations with uncertainty re
errors n beliefs to p e the accuracy of future predictions 
(Behrens, Woolrich, Walton & Rushworth, 2007; Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007). Under such 
circumstances, computational activity should in se in areas that subserve predictive 
codin certainty about actio eters (type and onset of responses), the 
right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) has recently en implicated to play a central role in 
predictive motor coding (Jakobs et al., 2009). Th  has been proposed to 
volve the updating of action expectations and/or the comparison of prepared motor 
ertainty such as our 
velop temporal expectations about the onset of the 
next stimulus and its associated response (Coull & Nobre, 2008; Langner et al., in press). We 
propose that the activity in right TPJ observed in our study reflects such temporal predictions 
and 
h in situations of temporal unce ou the m
k, 2007; Johansen-Berg et al., 
nect etween b
stu ies and our results we suggest
nds   
It has been postulated that the brai ntly re
ation — a feature that has b
sult in frequent prediction 
 a d constant updating of im rov
crea
g. With respect to un n param
be
e function of the TPJ
in
programs with current requirements. In RT tasks involving temporal unc
experimental conditions, participants de
their updating. This is consistent with recent theories of trial-to-trial conditioning 
processes governing temporal preparation in RT tasks under temporal uncertainty (Los et al., 
2001; Steinborn, Rolke et al., 2008).  
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The interpretation of a role of the TPJ in facilitating the speeded detection of stimuli by 
predictive coding is in line with previous studies on stimulus-driven attention (Corbetta and 
Shulman 2002; Downar, Crawley, Mikulis & Davis, 2000), which reported increased activity 
in the TPJ region during disruptions in expectation about incoming visual stimuli (i.e. 
increasing prediction error) or detection of sensory changes in the environment (i.e. updating 
the present prediction). A role of the right TPJ in establishing and updating implicit models of 
the temporal structure of sensory input under time uncertainty may also be inferred from 
Kansaku et al.’s (2004) study, in which right TPJ activity was observed during both 
monitoring of, and speeded responding to, temporally unpredictable stimuli of different 
modalities. Right TPJ activity was also observed during phasic alerting (Fan et al., 2005; 
Thiel
because of a congenital dysplasia is related to deficits in 
endo
erebellar involvement in precise motor timing has long been known from lesion 
studies (Ivry, 1996; Sailer, Eggert & Straube, 2005). Other studies demonstrated a specific 
role of the cerebellum in preparation. For in ed activation of the cerebellum in 
random ing in a task-switching experiment was observed by Dreher 
model, which is in line with the predictive-coding framework outlined above (cf. Nixon & 
 & Fink, 2007), which involves a similar situation at a smaller time scale: a warning cue 
facilitates detecting a stimulus after a variable delay. 
Another brain region associated with temporal preparation under time uncertainty is the 
cerebellum (Courchesne & Allen, 1997), which showed modality-independent alertness-
related activity in the anterior vermis and left intermediate hemisphere. This finding agrees 
well with other reports of cerebellar activity during alertness, sustained attention, and SRT 
performance (Kansaku et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2003; Sturm et al., 2004; Sturm & 
Willmes, 2001). Our results are also consistent with a recent study showing that the absence 
of the cerebellar vermis 
genously maintaining responsiveness to visual signals (Michael, Garcia, Bussy, Lion-
Francois & Guibaud, 2009). It should be noted, though, that the chosen field of view of our 
fMRI measurement only allowed us to image the superior cerebellum, precluding inferences 
on its lower parts.  
C
stance, increas
 compared to fixed tim
and Grafman (2002). Martin et al. (2006) showed with magnetoencephalography (MEG) that 
cerebellar activity predicted response speed in temporally unpredictable SRT tasks. Another 
recent MEG study (Pollok, Gross, Kamp & Schnitzler, 2008), which analyzed functional 
connectivity in a cerebello-diencephalic-parietal network, suggested that the cerebellum is 
involved in both anticipatory motor control and mismatch-contingent updating of an internal 
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Passingham, 2001; Trillenberg, Verleger, Teetzmann, Wascher & Wessel, 2004). Elaborating 
on the potential mechanism that mediates the cerebellar contribution to preparation, 
Courchesne and colleagues (Allen, Buxton, Wong & Courchesne, 1997; Courchesne et al., 
1994; Courchesne & Allen, 1997) suggested that the cerebellum shifts excitability thresholds 
in task-relevant neurons toward optimal levels, thereby continuously updating and adjusting 
patterns of responsiveness.  
 
4.4.3.  Arousal Regulation  
Apart from the cingulate motor zones, controversy surrounds the function of the ACC. 
Paus (2001) argued that the ACC is the place where motor control, executive attention, and 
arous
 activity related to maintaining 
respo
ch as noradrenalin, dopamine, acetylcholine, or serotonin, which 
inner
al regulation interface. This is in line with our data and previous studies on intrinsic 
alertness or vigilance, which consistently found ACC
nsiveness (Paus et al., 1997; Sturm et al. 1999, 2004; Sturm & Willmes, 2001). One role 
of the ACC in simple tasks requiring fast responding under temporal uncertainty might be the 
regulation of nonspecific arousal via top-down influences on midbrain and brainstem arousal 
systems in order to maintain optimal efficiency of information processing (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Critchley et al. 2003; Fischer et al., 2008; Sturm et al., 1999). This notion is 
corroborated by a PET study (Paus et al., 1997), in which the decline of arousal during a 60-
min vigilance task covaried with activity in ACC and midbrain structures. Further support 
comes from an effective-connectivity analysis of brain activity during intrinsic alerting 
(Mottaghy et al., 2006), which revealed top-down influences of the ACC on thalamus and 
brainstem structures associated with arousal regulation. Also, ACC activity has been 
repeatedly shown to increase with preparatory attention (Luks, Simpson, Feiwell & Miller, 
2002; Murtha, Chertkow, Beauregard, Dixon & Evans, 1996) and attentional effort (Mulert, 
Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell & Hegerl, 2005; Walton, Bannerman, Alterescu & Rushworth, 
2003). Along these lines we suggest that in tasks that demand intense attentiveness, the ACC 
is important for initiating and maintaining efficient goal-directed behavior by “energizing” 
cognition (see also Stuss, 2006). 
This energizing is thought to be mediated via input from midbrain and brainstem 
arousal systems (for reviews, see Jones, 2003; Pfaff, 2006). These systems employ various 
neurotransmitters, su
vate large parts of the cortex. In their target zones, they modulate computational 
processes and thus control the efficiency of information processing (Hasselmo, 1995; 
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Grefkes, Wang, Eickhoff & Fink, 2009). These neuromodulatory systems originate in 
subcortical regions, some of which correspond to activity foci of our study, such as the 
ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra (dopamine) or the locus coeruleus (noradrenalin). 
Furthermore, midbrain structures like the substantia nigra as well as the pons are implicated 
in the control of sympathetic autonomic arousal (Critchley, Melmed, Featherstone, Mathias & 
Dolan, 2002). We are aware that fMRI cannot localize these structures with certainty, since 
its spatial resolution is too coarse. Nevertheless, our data provide further evidence that 
distinct midbrain and brainstem structures involved in neuromodulation contribute to 
voluntarily maintaining an alert state.  
The network of ACC and midbrain/brainstem regions, mediating cerebral and bodily 
arousal, is also tightly connected with another area of the supramodal alertness network: the 
anterior insula, an area that has been found involved in representing bodily states (Craig 
2002; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman & Dolan, 2004). There are strong anatomical 
connections between anterior insula and ACC (Augustine, 1996; Mesulam & Mufson, 1982), 
and a recent fMRI study measuring resting-state connectivity provided evidence for a 
functional anterior-insula–cingulate system (Taylor, Seminowicz & Davis, 2009). Similar to 
ACC, anterior insula activity has not only been found in response to stimulus events but also 
in preparation for expected ones. For instance, a meta-analysis revealed that anterior insula 
activation increases prior to both expected losses and expected gains and correlates with both 
self-reported negative and positive arousal (Knutson & Greer, 2008). 
Thus, during intrinsic alerting, right anterior insula might feed integrated information on 
bodily states to ACC, which monitors and, if necessary, adjusts arousal to maintain optimal 
readiness in body and brain. This assumption is supported by the finding that activity in right 
anterior insula, right ACC, cerebellum and brainstem covaries with peripheral cardiovascular 
arousal (i.e. sympathetic autonomic activity) induced by mental or physical stressors 
(Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias & Dolan, 2000; see also Pollatos, Schandry, Auer & 
Kaufmann, 2007). In line with this notion is another recent study (Eckert et al., 2009) that 
reported significant functional connectivity between right anterior insula and ACC across 
different attention-demanding tasks, leading to the conclusion that the right anterior insula 
may be especially critical for modulating cognitive control systems under challenging 
conditions. Apart from cognitive challenges, this might also, or even particularly, apply to 
very simple tasks like ours, which are challenging, because they are repetitive and ultimately 
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boring but still require the continuous, effortful maintenance of attention (cf. Fischer et al., 
2008; Walker et al., 2009). 
 
4.4.4.  Unimodal Alertness-Related Activity 
 only voxels that showed higher activity during 
alertn
wo 
additional foci of activity emerged for the mixed condition when it was directly compared 
Maintaining alertness involves sustained (preparatory) attention to sensory input, which 
facilitates subsequent processing. Our findings corroborate the hypothesis that modality-
specific attentional modulations should be found in areas that process sensory information of 
the given modality. Indeed, the only unimodal components of the alertness-related network 
corresponded to primary and secondary auditory cortex, primary and higher-order 
somatosensory cortex, and visual association cortex, respectively. The absence of increased 
alertness-related activity in primary visual cortex during visual alertness is most likely due to 
the processing of some visual input (fixation cross) in all three unimodal alertness conditions. 
It should be noted that the unimodal alertness-related activity is not due to simple stimulus 
processing, since the outcome included
ess than during the sensorimotor control tasks, which actually provided much more 
sensory stimulation.  
In general, our modality-specific results show remarkable overlap with findings from a 
study that had its participants attend to auditory, somatosensory and visual stimulation, each 
of which randomly alternated between two modes (Downar et al., 2000). This suggests that 
change detection is subserved by cortical modules that are also the target of attentional 
modulation in tasks like ours, which require detecting the mere presence of stimuli of a given 
modality. Since Downar et al. did not find change-related effects in primary somatosensory 
cortex, this overlap might not apply to tactile stimulation. We conclude that modality-specific 
activity is related to stimulus anticipation and attentional enhancement of stimulus processing 
during the alertness conditions. This again implicates that other subprocesses during intrinsic 
alerting, e.g. related to motor preparation, timing, or arousal, are independent of stimulus 
modality.  
 
4.4.5.  Additional Alertness-Related Activity With Unpredictable Stimulus Modality  
In the mixed condition, in which stimulus modality was unpredictable, the pattern of 
activity showed large overlap with the network shared by all three unimodal conditions. T
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.4.6.  Conclusions 
We performed one of the first fMRI studies on the brain network that supramodally 
contr
st the unimodal conditions: left dPMC and bilateral precuneus. We suggest that the 
additional left-sided dPMC activity reflects (i) increased demands on signal detection because 
of the larger number of input channels to be monitored and (ii) the associated more complex 
stimulus–response mapping to be maintained. This interpretation is in line with findings from 
other studies requiring attention to be divided between different sensory modalities (Lewis, 
Beauchamp & DeYoe, 2000; Saito et al., 2005; Vohn et al., 2007). 
Precuneus activation has been previously shown during voluntary attentional shifts 
between spatial (Krumbholz, Nobis, Weatheritt & Fink, 2009) and non-spatial (Le, Pardo & 
Hu, 1998) features of auditory and visual stimuli as well as between auditory and visual 
stimulus modalities (Shomstein & Yantis, 2004). Although our mixed condition did not 
require voluntary shifts of attention between modalities, the participants might have adopted 
a resource-saving strategy of cyclically or probabilistically shifting their attention between 
the three modalities instead of being prepared for all of them all the time. Trials in which 
preparation was not directed toward the correct modality would then have provided some 
room for stimulus-driven reorienting to the modality of the current stimulus (see Appendix E 
for supplemental discussion).  
4
ols intrinsic alertness (i.e. the readiness to respond in unwarned situations). To induce 
intrinsic alerting, we used non-cued SRT tasks with variable interstimulus intervals and three 
different stimulus modalities. Regardless of sensory modality, intrinsic alerting was 
subserved by a mainly right-hemisphere network, which confirms findings of earlier 
unimodal PET studies and extends them to the somatosensory modality. We identified 
multimodal brain regions which have been associated with different subprocesses of alerting, 
such as maintaining the stimulus–response mapping, balancing motor preparation and 
inhibition, building temporal expectations, and regulating arousal. In this supramodal 
alertness network, the ACC might be the central coordinating structure for readying body and 
brain for action. Modality-specific activity, presumably related to anticipating the response 
signal, was confined to sensory cortices. When monitoring demands were increased by 
making stimulus modality unpredictable, additional left frontal and medial parietal areas were 
recruited. The challenge for the future is to further specify the functional significance of each 
identified brain region by delineating the neurocomputational operations these regions and 
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their interplay subserve during intrinsic alerting. This endeavor has also direct relevance for 
the treatment of impaired alertness regulation in various neurological and psychiatric patient 
groups, since understanding the neural basis of specific cognitive subprocesses offers the 
chance for more focused diagnostic and therapeutic approaches with substantially improved 
outcome. 
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5.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Apart from a summary of the main findings and conclusions of the three studies, the 
general discussion will focus on aspects of the studies that were omitted from the papers for 
reasons of space. Further, the discussion will deal with implications of the findings for future 
research and applications. 
 
5.1.  Summary of Main Findings and Conclusions 
 
 the question of whether the well-known decrement of 
conti
uraven & Baumeister, 2000). This so-called “ego depletion” 
has been observed across a wide range of tasks that require active volition or the inhibition of 
The first study dealt with
nuous SRT performance with TOT is due to mental fatigue or mindlessness. To this end, 
we manipulated stimulus intensity and stimulation monotony and observed the effect on 
performance change over time. The pattern of results argued strongly for the mental-fatigue 
hypothesis, supporting resource theory, which assumes that the depletion of attentional 
resources underlies such time-related deterioration (e.g. Grier et al., 2003; Helton & Warm, 
2008; Smit et al., 2004). Taking others’ and our results together, we conclude that the 
prolonged performance of computationally easy SRT tasks is increasingly impaired by 
growing mental fatigue and that the amount of fatigue and impairment accumulating over 
time appears to depend on the demands placed on attentional systems. Nevertheless, our self-
report data also showed that task-unrelated thoughts increased during SRT performance, 
which suggests that increasing mindlessness (e.g. Pattyn et al., 2008; Robertson et al., 1997) 
might also contribute to performance decrements in SRT tasks.  
This led us to propose a hierarchical model of performance decrements with TOT, 
which incorporates both aspects, resource depletion and mindlessness. Briefly, on the top 
level, the model assumes self-regulatory power as the basic driving force behind the sustained 
performance of an – arguably – boring and not intrinsically rewarding task like the 
continuous SRT task. Close connections between attentional control and self-regulation have 
already been proposed earlier (e.g. Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Tang et al., 2008). Recent 
research considers self-regulation a limited resource that gets depleted with prolonged use 
(R. F. Baumeister et al., 2007; M
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prepo
d independent measures of self-control strength. Also, 
RT a
 decrement with TOT. 
This 
tent actions or both, for example making personally meaningful choices, restraining 
emotional impulses or resisting temptations (e.g. R. F. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & 
Tice, 1998; Vohs et al., 2008; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Our model proposes that the 
depletion of attentional resources as well as absent-mindedness follow from a reduction of 
self-control strength over time. We interpret the depletion of attentional resources as a 
decrease in the intensity of top-down attentional modulations that normally facilitate task-
relevant computational processes to optimize performance (Spitzer et al., 1988). That is, 
attentional effort is diminished with reduced self-regulatory power. At the same time, our 
model assumes that the task goal cannot be maintained constantly when self-control strength 
decreases. That is, the number of attentional lapses increases, since internal or external 
distractors draw attention away from the task with increasing ease, producing phenomena 
such as mind-wandering (Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Of course, 
the proposed model requires empirical testing with different and possibly parametric 
manipulations of attentional demand an
nalysis may be refined by including different measures such as RT variability (cf. 
Flehmig et al., 2007) and the number of extra-long responses (cf. Bills, 1931), since they 
might be differentially sensitive to the various processes presumably underlying performance 
change over time (Steinborn, Flehmig, Westhoff & Langner, 2009). 
The second study explored whether mental fatigue from prolonged TOT also impacts 
alertness by impairing processes of temporal preparation. Using a forewarned SRT task with 
three different foreperiods that varied randomly from trial to trial, we found the typical time-
related increase in overall RT but no time-related modulation of indices of temporal 
preparation (i.e. the variable-FP effect and the asymmetrical sequential FP effect). This 
shows that the cognitive processes underlying the timing of preparatory attention under 
temporal uncertainty do not contribute significantly to the alertness
result also has implications for the nature of the timing processes: since mental fatigue 
primarily affects top-down control processes, our finding is more consistent with a recent 
bottom-up associative-learning account of temporal preparation (Los et al., 2001; Steinborn, 
Rolke et al., 2008) than a strategic account based on intentional conditional probability 
monitoring and endogenous temporal orienting (Näätäänen & Merisalo, 1977; Nobre, 2001). 
In the third study, we tested to what extent the activity of the brain network subserving 
intrinsic alertness depends on the sensory modality of the stimuli presented. To this end, we 
measured brain activity with fMRI during tasks requiring the speeded detection of auditory, 
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vibrotactile, or visual stimuli presented at unpredictable times. The effect of increased 
monitoring demand was tested in a fourth condition in which stimulus modality was 
unpredictable. In contrast to sensorimotor control tasks, all three unimodal alertness 
conditions showed stronger activity in the right temporo-parietal junction, inferior frontal 
cortex, anterior insula, dorsal premotor cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex as well as 
bilateral mid-cingulum, midbrain, brainstem and medial cerebellum. Modality-specific 
alertness-related activity was confined to respective sensory areas. With unpredictable 
stimu in left dorsal premotor cortex and bilateral 
precuneus. These findings corroborate the modality-independence of a predominantly right-
lateralized core network for m
 
e been shown to impair SRT task performance. For instance, Lisper and Kjellberg 
(1972) and Maruff, Falleti, Collie, Darby & McStephen (2005) found a significant SRT 
increase after 24 hours of sleep deprivation. Increases in SRT have also been reported as a 
lus modality, additional activity was found 
aintaining a highly alert state and extend previous results to the 
tactile modality. Increasing the monitoring demand through uncertainty about stimulus 
modality appears to induce additional processing in left frontal and medial parietal cortex, 
which might be related to maintaining the more complex stimulus–response mapping and 
orienting attention to a given sensory modality. 
In the following, we will discuss several aspects of the three studies that touch upon 
broader issues of interest, which space limitations precluded from being considered in the 
Discussion sections of the respective papers. 
 
5.2.  Arousal and Performance Decline 
In addition to mental fatigue or mindlessness, some theorists have proposed that a 
decrease in arousal may be one of the reasons for the time-related deterioration of 
performance in vigilance tasks (Heilman, 1995; Loeb & Alluisi, 1984; Koelega, 1996). This 
might also apply to SRT tasks, since they are similar to typical vigilance paradigms. Indeed, 
prolonged SRT tasks usually are even more repetitive and predictable and, therefore, 
monotonous and de-arousing. For example, Dirnberger et al. (2004) observed that a repetitive 
simple motor task was accompanied by a reduction of movement-related electrocortical 
activity over time, which has been taken to reflect a decline of arousal-related cortical 
excitability. Low arousal has often been found to be associated with decreased cognitive 
efficiency (see, e.g., Eysenck, 1982, for a review), and manipulations that reduce general 
arousal hav
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conse gs 
(e.g. 
968; Zuercher, 1965) or 
stimu
ities, including the effects of noise (e.g. Brocke, Tasche & 
Beauducel, 1997; A. Smith & Nutt, 1996), odours (e.g. Hiruma, Yabe, Sato, Sutoh & 
Kane mber & Parasuraman, 1991), or light (e.g. Badia, Myers, Boecker, 
Culpepper & Harsh, 1991; Phipps-Nelson, Redman, Dijk & Rajaratnam, 2003). Generally, 
the m
quence of prolonged partial sleep deprivation (Dinges et al., 1997) or sedative dru
Wesensten, Balkin et al., 2005). Administering arousal-enhancing drugs (e.g. caffeine or 
amphetamines) or physical stimulation (e.g. bright light) has been shown to improve SRT 
performance and to attenuate sleep deprivation deficits (e.g. K. P. Wright et al., 1997; 
Wesensten, Killgore & Balkin, 2005). Taken together, SRT performance correlates with 
general arousal level, but the question remains whether the performance decline with TOT is 
related to a decrease in arousal. 
Indirect support for this assumption has come from studies on vigilance showing that a 
performance decline can be ameliorated by extraneous or self-generated stimulation (e.g. 
Davies, Land & Shackelton, 1975; Mackworth, 1956; Randel, 1
lant drugs such as caffeine (Koelega, 1993; Temple et al., 2000). In fact, the results of 
Study 1 are also consistent with an arousal explanation of SRT performance decline, since the 
low-intensity stimuli are not only harder to detect and therefore attentionally more demanding 
than high-intensity stimuli but also provide less stimulation and therefore induce less arousal.  
Arousal is evoked by sensory input via excitatory collateral projections of sensory 
pathways to brainstem arousal systems and/or their “continuations” in thalamic nuclei (Foote, 
Aston-Jones & Bloom, 1980; Grunwerg & Krauthamer, 1992; Sarter, Givens & Bruno, 2001; 
Schiff, 2008; Vandewalle et al., 2006). Arousing effects of sensory stimulation and their 
positive associations with different measures of cognitive efficiency have been demonstrated 
across several stimulus modal
ko, 2002; Warm, De
ore intense a stimulation, the more arousing it is (Geen, 1984; Uno & Grings, 1965). 
Sanders (1983) suggested that stimulus intensity determines the magnitude of the “immediate 
arousal” accompanying sensory input, which, in turn, increases “activation,” the readiness to 
respond. Similarly, it has been suggested by Posner (1978) that the automatic change in 
arousal brought about by sensory stimulation is mediated by the same pathways that are 
responsible for maintaining response readiness (see also Whitehead, 1991). Studies on reflex 
pathway reactivity showed that neural excitability (as expressed by reflex amplitude) 
increased unspecifically after sensory input (for a review, see Requin et al., 1991, pp. 424-
425). This effect “was found to be an enhancement of the general arousal effect of any 
stimulus without warning significance, and depended on its intensity” (ibid., p. 425).  
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The concept of general arousal has a long history in psychology and related fields and 
has faced many criticisms (see, e.g., Hockey, 2008; Neiss, 1988, but see Anderson, 1990, for 
a reply). Although some critics questioned the explanatory value of a general arousal concept 
(e.g. Hancock, 1987; Hanoch & Vitouch, 2004; Hockey, 1997; Robbins & Everitt, 1995), 
evidence supporting the usefulness of this concept has accumulated across various research 
domains, including cognition (e.g. Steinborn, Rolke et al., 2008), emotion (e.g. Keil et al., 
2008; Russell, 2003), cognitive-emotional interactions (e.g. Bradley, Greenwald, Petry & 
Lang, 1992; Mather, 2007), personality factors (e.g. Beauducel, Brocke & Leue, 2006), and 
developmental aspects (e.g. Mayes, 2000). Also, research in neuropsychology (e.g. Whyte, 
Polansky, Fleming, Coslett & Cavallucci, 1995), neurology (e.g. Schiff, 2008) and cognitive 
neuroscience (e.g. Coull, 1998; Gobbelé et al., 2000; Gonzáles & Aston-Jones, 2006; 
Hackley et al., 2009; Oken, Salinsky & Elsass, 2006; Paus, 2000; Robbins & Arnsten, 2009) 
has found merit in using this concept to describe global changes in the functional state of 
patients or participants.  
In response to past criticisms, earlier views of arousal as a one-dimensional concept 
have been abandoned in favour of compound views that consider arousal to consist of a 
generalized component and context-specific ones (Garey et al., 2003; Pfaff, 2006; Pfaff, 
Ribeiro, Matthews & Kow, 2008). For instance, Pfaff (2006) maintained that the “activation 
of brain and behavior depends on a compound function of a primitive brainstem system 
common to many states combined with neural and hormonal forces that arise from specific 
biologic needs” (p. 7). Similarly, Robbins and Arnsten (2009) stated in a recent review on 
neuromodulation of fronto-executive functioning: “These different [arousal] levels may 
reflect fluctuations in the sleep–wake cycle, motivation, mood, and stress, which, while 
constituting distinct processes, may have a common currency through PFC [prefrontal cortex] 
arousal” (p. 268). According to such current views, generalized arousal reflects the general 
responsiveness of the brain and is considered a prerequisite for, and a modulator of, the 
activation of specific cognitive systems (Fischer et al., 2008; Pfaff et al., 2008).  
Neurobiologically, arousal is assumed to reflect the excitability of cortical neurons 
(Elbert, 1993; Elbert & Rockstroh, 1987; Fischer et al., 2008), which is modulated via input 
from several distinct neuromodulatory arousal systems originating in the brainstem and other 
subcortical areas and innervating large parts of the cortex (Pfaff, 2006; Jones, 2003). In their 
target zones, input from these arousal systems leads to changes in the functional state of 
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cortical neuronal cell assemblies, for instance by enhancing the signal-to-noise ratio, thus 
facilitating cortical informat ay (Hasselmo, 1995). 
an influential theory about how general 
arousal may exert its influence on performance: Kahneman (1973) and Humphreys and 
Reve
nsidered to represent a subjective estimate of resource availability 
(Helton & Warm, 2008; Matthews et al., 2000). The exact mechanisms through which 
arousal may influen t, but Kahneman’s 
original proposal is consistent with neuroimaging studies that reported interaction effects of 
arous
al stimulation can diminish 
perfo
ion processing in a rather nonspecific w
The neurobiological findings agree well with 
lle (1984) have argued that arousal determines the availability of cognitive resources 
(see also Matthews, Davies & Lees, 1990; Thiffault & Bergeron, 2003). This notion is also 
reflected in the fact that the Energetic Arousal dimension of the Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire (DSSQ) is co
ce resource availability have not been explicated ye
al and attentional manipulations in specific brain areas (e.g. Coull, Jones, Egan, Frith & 
Maze, 2004; Fischer et al., 2008; Foucher, Otzenberger & Gounot, 2004; Portas et al., 1998). 
In addition to assuming that more resources are available with increased arousal, we suggest 
that the hypothesized or perceived enhanced resource availability with higher arousal might 
also reflect a reduced resource demand for a given piece of information to be processed. This 
might result from an arousal-induced increase in the speed of information processing, by 
which stable representations of stimuli and task rules may be achieved earlier and with 
consuming less resources. In sum, arousal appears to be positively correlated with the general 
efficiency of cognitive processes, mediated via its impact on the availability of, or demand 
for, cognitive resources. 
According to this reasoning, it is plausible to assume that a decrease in arousal over 
time contributes to time-related SRT performance decrements. Conversely, it is also plausible 
to assume that mitigating a decrease in arousal with extern
rmance decrements associated with suboptimal arousal. Therefore, the finding reported 
in Study 1 that the increased stimulation during the Mixed compared to the Pure-Low 
condition supports the efficient processing of low-intensity stimuli could also be explained 
within the framework of arousal theory. This explanation is also consistent with results from 
Matthews and Davies (1998), who manipulated event rate and target salience and found 
beneficial effects of high arousal only on more demanding vigilance tasks. Still, an 
explanation of the entire pattern of results in Study 1 based solely on arousal theory is rather 
improbable, since it has been repeatedly shown that visual stimuli induce reliable arousal 
effects only with extreme intensities (Jaskowski & Włodarczyk, 2006; Niemi & Lehtonen, 
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1982; Sanders, 1975). It should also be noted that the arousal theory of the vigilance 
decrement has been criticized before. Several theorists concluded that arousal, at least when 
viewed as a unidimensional concept, cannot explain all of the changes with TOT observed in 
vigilance situations (e.g. Loeb & Alluisi, 1984; Parasuraman, Warm & See, 1998; Warm, 
Matthews & Finomore, 2008). 
To disentangle effects of attentional resource depletion and arousal decrease, future 
research needs to employ tasks with independent manipulations of attentional demand and 
environmental stimulation (i.e. arousal), if possible in combination with subjective reports 
and physiological measures. This issue becomes even more complex when considering 
arousal not only as a passive entity evoked by external or internal stimulation but as a 
variable that can also be controlled voluntarily. Neurophysiological correlates of 
compensatory arousal regulation have begun to be investigated (e.g. Fischer et al., 2008). 
Since this kind of top-down regulation is also considered effortful, mental fatigue might also 
include a reduced capacity to endogenously up-regulate arousal in monotonous, de-arousing 
situations. 
 
5.3.  Mechanisms Underlying Temporal Preparation 
populations. As a solution, a dual-process model was proposed that combines intentional 
prepa
 
In Study 2, we found no evidence for a change of the variable-foreperiod (FP) effect or 
the sequential FP effect with TOT. This was interpreted as support for an explanation of FP 
effects that is based on associative learning (i.e. trace conditioning) instead of intentional 
probability monitoring and temporal orienting. The learning account maintains that the 
variable-FP effect is an emerging property of the asymmetry of the sequential FP effect, 
which, in turn, is based on a trial-to-trial update of associations between warning signal and 
critical moments (Los et al., 2001; Los & van den Heuvel, 2001). It has become clear, 
however, that this learning mechanism can hardly account for the entire phenomenon of 
temporal preparation under time uncertainty (Los & Agter, 2005). For instance, Vallesi and 
colleagues (Vallesi et al., 2007; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007) have reported dissociations 
between the variable and the sequential FP effects in developmental and neuropsychological 
ratory processes with sequential effects of arousal level. In this model, arousal is 
assumed to decrease during FPs, naturally more so during long than short ones (Vallesi & 
Shallice, 2007). Without going into the details of this account, it is quite clear, however, that 
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the postulation of an energetic variable like arousal playing a pivotal role in timing aspects of 
preparation is rather inconsistent with not finding any interaction between TOT-induced 
mental fatigue and indices of temporal preparation in our study.  
According to our rationale, a potential solution would need to involve a mechanism that 
is based on nonintentional, automatic processes, which pose little demands for attentional 
control and are thus less affected by energetic factors. In fact, such a mechanism is not too 
hard to be imagined. All it needs is reframing the traditional intentional probability-
monitoring account as a set of nonintentional processes that compute an anticipation function, 
that is, the subjective hazard rate. This hazard rate reflects the probability that a stimulus 
occurs at a given time, given that is has not yet occurred (Luce, 1986). For the computation of 
the hazard rate, the brain needs a representation of the passage of time and a representation of 
the probabilistic time schedule of stimulus occurrence (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005). It can be 
assumed that both representations do not necessarily rely on top-down control (cf. Nobre, 
Correa & Coull, 2007). Similar to moment–response associations modulated by a trial-to-trial 
condi
ive hazard function can, however, not explain 
sequential FP effects. Therefore, we assume that a trial-to-trial learning process runs in 
parallel, which modulates the outcome of the hazard-related computations. This conjecture of 
course needs empirical test odelling of the two 
processes to compare their explanatory power. 
tioning processes as suggested by Los and colleagues (e.g. Los et al., 2001), the 
subjective hazard rate may then automatically guide the allocation of attentional resources 
within time. Anticipation based on a subject
ing, ideally involving computational m
. 
5.4.  The Neurobiology of Alertness Regulation 
 
In the following section, some further thoughts on the roles of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and anterior insula for maintaining alertness will be discussed. In Study 3, we 
discussed the non-motor function of the ACC in terms of a coordinating structure that 
controls the level of arousal (cf. Sturm et al., 1999; Mottaghy et al., 2006). The function of 
the anterior insula was regarded as representing the state of bodily arousal and feeding this 
information to the ACC as well as being part of the circuit that regulates peripheral arousal 
(Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2002). In light of Study 1, it seems reasonable to assume that 
maintaining the task set (e.g. goal-shielding) is important for maintaining high performance 
levels in SRT tasks, i.e. for maintaining alertness. Recent studies suggest that task-set 
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maintenance might be subserved by a functional ACC–insula system. For instance, 
Dosenbach et al. (2006) found across ten different tasks and 183 subjects that dorsal ACC 
and bilateral anterior insula showed reliable start-cue and sustained activations across tasks. 
This was taken as evidence that these regions form a core system for implementing task sets. 
The notion that an ACC–anterior-insula network is involved in the maintenance of task sets is 
further supported by a study using resting-state fMRI (Dosenbach et al., 2007). 
How might task sets be implemented and how could this process be related to arousal 
regul
signa
tion of 
ation? There might be a direct influence of ACC/insula on computational processes in 
other cortical regions via cortico-cortical interactions (e.g. connections between ACC and 
mid-cingulate motor zones), but there might also be an indirect influence mediated via 
subcortical loops that involve brainstem arousal centres (Corbetta, Patel & Shulman, 2008). 
The locus coeruleus (LC), a major brainstem arousal centre that innervates large parts of the 
cortex via widespread noradrenergic projections, receives input from ACC and insula (Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005; Ongur, Ferry & Price, 2003). These inputs might transmit control 
ls through which ACC and insula regulate LC output. Apart from its role in mediating 
transitions between arousal-related behavioural states (e.g. sleep, alert wakefulness) through a 
change in its tonic firing mode (cf. Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005), the LC system might also 
contribute to implementing task sets through its phasic burst activity, which has been 
interpreted as a “network reset” signal (Bouret & Sara, 2005) driving the (re)configuration of 
target networks after a target is detected and maybe when a target is expected, too. Since 
Study 3 found alertness-related activity in the vicinity of the LC, efficient SRT performance 
might depend on a repeated, ACC/insula-initiated and LC-mediated reset of the task-relevant 
brain network to “stay on the job” continuously.  
This conceptualization of ACC control over subcortical arousal structures is also 
consistent with inferences drawn from behavioural deficits in patients with lesions in the 
ACC and medial frontal cortex: Stuss and colleagues (Picton, Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & 
Gillingham, 2006; Shallice, Stuss, Alexander, Picton & Derkzen, 2008; Stuss, 2006; Stuss et 
al., 1995, 2005) proposed that these regions subserve the “energization” of cognition, that is, 
they activate specific task schemata or task sets. This assumption is supported by the 
substantially slowed performance of patients with such lesions in various RT tasks 
(Alexander, Stuss, Shallice, Picton & Gillingham, 2005; Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss, Binns, 
Murphy & Alexander, 2002) as well as by their deficits in non-motor tasks of sustained 
attention (Shallice et al., 2008). Taking these findings together, we suggest the alloca
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attent
insula uses the representation of bodily states to perceive time. 
Speci
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that alertness as measured with SRT tasks is far 
from 
factors that are specific to the given operationalization and diminishes conceptual overlap 
ional resources, which according to Study 1 gets impaired with TOT, might be a 
metaphor for a network reset, and the dependence of the phasic LC mode on the underlying 
tonic mode (cf. Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) might constitute one of the neural 
underpinnings of the influence of arousal on the availability of such resources, as suggested 
by Kahneman (1973) or Humphreys and Revelle (1984). The ACC then might exert control 
over both LC firing modes, adaptively adjusting LC activity according to task demands as 
well as behavioural goals. This view of ACC function is also consistent with studies that 
argue for a general role of the ACC in self-regulation (Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Posner, 
Rothbart, Sheese & Tang, 2007), which agrees with our proposal of a hierarchical model of 
depletable self-regulatory power underlying performance decrements in tasks that require 
sustained attention. 
Finally, there is a new, alternative but complementary hypothesis as to what kind of 
information might be processed in the anterior insula: recently, it has been suggested (Craig, 
2009) that the anterior 
fically, this hypothesis assumes that through temporally integrating successive signals 
from within the body, a series of “emotional moments” is produced, which brings about the 
perception of duration. Therefore, based on this proposal, it might be speculated whether in 
RT tasks with variable interstimulus intervals, such as the one used in Study 3, anterior insula 
integrates information on elapsed time after each response and sends it to the temporo-
parietal junction, where it is then used, together with probability representations, for the 
preparatory timing of the allocation of attentional resources. This fits nicely with our above 
conjecture regarding the computation of a subjective hazard rate based on representations of 
elapsed time and the probability schedule of expected events.  
 
5.5.  Implications for Future Research and Applications 
 
being a unitary entity. The main reason for this state of affairs lies in the differences 
between the theoretical concept and its operationalization. It is generally assumed that every 
operationalization is only an impure reflection of the concept it purports to measure. This 
concerns the well-know issue of construct validity, which is never perfect, since any 
transition from the level of abstract, latent concepts to concrete, manifest measures introduces 
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between the latent construct and its manifest indicator. As already mentioned in the 
introduction, alertness is usually measured by means of SRT tasks. It is defined, however, as 
readin
odalities to investigate the core brain network 
subse
ess to respond to external events (cf. Posner, 1978). Therefore, the aspect of motor 
activity in its operationalization via SRT tasks is a component that goes beyond the 
theoretical definition, since response readiness does not necessarily include responding, at 
least not only overt responding. This means the motor part of SRT tasks constitutes a specific 
factor unrelated to the theoretical concept. The problem for diagnostic applications that 
results from this is that differences in SRT performance between people might not be related 
to true differences in alertness (in its theoretical meaning) but to differences in computational 
processes related to producing rapid stimulus-contingent motor output. 
Therefore it may be advisable for future research as well as applications to employ 
several different operationalizations of alertness. Apart from SRT tasks, this could be tasks 
that require a high sensory responsiveness without involving a fast motor response. These 
tasks should also reflect (aspects of) the construct “alertness” validly. Such a task could, for 
example, require participants to mentally count slight deviations in a given feature of stimuli 
that are presented only very briefly. Or, the task could require the detection of subtle 
differences in the onset of two stimuli presented (nearly) in parallel. Since all these potential 
operationalizations in principle suffer from the same limitation of incomplete overlap with 
the latent construct, future research or applied testing may consider using more than just one 
task to measure alertness. In fact, this notion is an extension of the approach adopted in Study 
3. However, instead of using different m
rving alertness, the proposed method would entail using different types of task to get 
down to the core. This approach is not new; for instance, research on sustained attention has 
employed a variety of paradigms that differ in their task-specific additional factors, such as 
the continuous performance task (which itself is used in several versions), the rapid visual 
information-processing task, sustained counting, or serial mental addition, just to name a few.  
In addition to this “conjunction” approach it might be worthwhile to study SRT tasks 
more systematically. Since they constitute the primary operationalization of alertness and are 
widely used in applied neuropsychological settings (e.g. Sturm, 2006; Zimmermann & Fimm, 
1993), it might be advantageous to learn more about the different component processes of 
this task. This would comprise (a) applying manipulations that specifically target one of the 
assumed subprocesses; (b) delineating the specific computational contributions of each part 
of the brain network involved; and (c) using sophisticated ways of RT and error analysis that 
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go beyond means or medians (e.g. distributional analyses) to develop indices that specifically 
reflect changes in one of the contributing subprocesses. These developments are hoped to 
improve both the understanding of the specific mechanisms through which different factors 
affect alertness and the diagnosis of specific deficits in various patient populations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A 
Table A1  
Supramodal General Task-Related Activity 
Cluster/Area x, y, z z-score 
   
Clus
R cer
R ant 20 -48 -26 Inf. 
L pre -30 -26  56 Inf. 
L dor
L fro
L pos -48 -26  14 7.03 
L pos 9 
L mid
R thalam
R do
R pre
L precentral gyrus 
L pos
L posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23) 0 -24  28 4.62 
ter 1 (k = 19110, p < .001)   
L SMA (BA 6) -6  -8  54 Inf. 
ebellar vermis 6 -58 -18 Inf. 
erior cerebellar lobe 
R anterior cerebellum (vermis) 14 -50 -22 Inf. 
central gyrus 
L thalamus -16 -16   4 7.80 
sal premotor cortex (BA 6) -38 -18  52 7.75 
L precentral gyrus -32 -24  66 7.49 
ntal operculum -46   2   0 7.44 
terior STG 
L middle insula/claustrum -32   0  -4 6.71 
L anterior insula -30  16  10 6.57 
terior insula -42 -30  20 6.3
R inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula 44  20   2 6.16 
dle insula/Rolandic operculum -40  -2  12 5.89 
us 10 -14   4 5.80 
rsal premotor cortex (BA 6) 44   0  50 5.30 
R anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32) 4  16  40 5.13 
-SMA (BA 8) 8  16  48 4.95 
-56 -22  42 4.89 
terior cingulate cortex (BA 31) -10 -26  48 4.78 
R subthalamic nucleus 16 -10  -6 4.67 
L temporo-parietal junction (BA 40/22) -60 -38  24 4.55 
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L inferior parietal lobule -52 -38  48 4.53 
tral premotor cortex (BA 44) 52   8   6 4.50 R ven
R pu 4.46 
 
L mid
Clus
R inf
  
R pos
R inf
R pos 66 -34   0 5.34 
R po
R pos
L nucleus ruber -8 -18 -14 4.49 
tamen 28   0   6
L rostrodorsal pons (locus coeruleus) -6 -26 -18 4.40 
  
Cluster 2 (k = 483, p < .001)  
dle/inferior occipital gyri -28 -90 -4 Inf. 
   
ter 3 (k = 604, p < .001)  
R middle/inferior occipital gyri 32 -88 -4 Inf. 
erior occipital gyrus 38 -68 -6 3.61 
 
Cluster 4 (k = 3218, p < .001)  
terior STG 60 -36  14 7.14 
R temporo-parietal junction (BA 40/22) 54 -38  22 6.77 
. parietal lobule 48 -48  44 5.81 
terior MTG 
R inferior parietal lobule 46 -42  40 5.29 
R posterior MTG 54 -38   2 4.98 
sterior insula 36 -34 20 4.30 
R intraparietal sulcus 30 -50 40 4.29 
terior STS 52 -24 -10 3.95 
R posterior STG 64 -16 8 3.44 
 
Note. L = left; R = right; BA = Brodmann area; (pre-)SMA = (pre-)supplementary 
motor area; STG/MTG = superior/middle temporal gyrus; STS = superior temporal 
sulcus. Coordinates x, y, z refer to MNI space; k = number of voxels in cluster; p-value 
represents cluster-level error probability corrected for multiple comparisons. 
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Appendix B 
Table A2  
ness-Related Activity in the Mixed Condition Alert
Cluster/Area x, y, z z-score 
   
Clus  
R precentral gyrus (dPMC) 
R mi
  
L mid
L pre
 
R mi
L mid -12 -70  44 3.65 
R mi
   
R pos
R posterior STS (TPJ) 46 -44  14 4.33 
R inf
R inf 3.42 
Clus
R pre-SMA (BA 8) 4.17 
R pre
   
ter 1 (k = 338, p = .002) 
L posterior STS (TPJ) -58 -46 10 5.53 
   
Cluster 2 (k = 435, p < .001)  
36  0  48 5.07 
ddle frontal gyrus 32 10  48 4.56 
 
Cluster 3 (k = 623, p < .001)  
dle frontal gyrus -30   2  52 4.90 
central gyrus (dPMC) -28  -4  50 4.86 
L superior frontal gyrus -20   2  56 4.43 
  
Cluster 4 (k = 800, p < .001)  
ddle precuneus 0 -58  48 4.83 
L anterior precuneus -8 -48  56 3.98 
dle precuneus 
L anterior precuneus -8 -46  48 3.60 
ddle precuneus 6 -68  42 3.21 
Cluster 5 (k = 363, p = .002)  
terior STG (TPJ) 52 -46  14 4.47 
   
Cluster 6 (k = 286, p = .005)  
R inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 40  20  18 4.42 
erior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis) 40  14  24 4.01 
erior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis) 36   6  24
   
ter 7* (k = 140, p = .085)  
6  30  46
-SMA (BA 6) 8  22  50 4.16 
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Cluster 8 (k = 232, p = .014)  
ular gyrus 34 -62  40 3.86 R ang
R angular gyrus 36 -58  46 3.84 
 
Note. J = temporo-parietal junction; dPMC 
z refer to M  k = number of voxels in cluster; p-value represents cluster-level 
* signi
L = left; R = right; BA = Brodmann area; TP
= dorsal premotor cortex; pre-SMA = pre-supplementary motor area. Coordinates x, y, 
NI space;
error probability corrected for multiple comparisons. 
ficant only at corrected cluster-level p < .1 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Figure A1. General task-related brain activity across all three unimodal 
conditions (alertness tasks vs. resting baseline). 
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
Figure A2. vity in the mixed c
unpredictab  modality (alertness task vs. unimoda trol 
tasks) 
 
 Alertness-related brain acti
le stimulus
ondition with 
l con
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Appendix E 
 
Supplemental Discussion 
n ctivity 
The  of brain activity during task  bas ealed a widespread 
netwo  s en all three unimodal task conditions, comprising foci in all lobes of the 
brain as well as in midbrain, brainstem, and cerebell ructur ( able A1 and Figure 
A1). This finding replicates and extends results of earlier studies that explored supramodal 
brain activity elicited by simple reaction-time tasks using stimu o same three sensory 
moda e 0 vity foci not previously reported in 
those studies as belonging to a modality-independent network m h  been detected here 
because of the higher sensitivity of our study re m more trial replications (task 
duration per modality: Naito et al.: 200 ms; Kansaku et al.: 3 x 27 m  the larger 
sample size (Naito  9; Kansaku et al.: n = 10). As expe l task-related 
network mainly consisted of areas controlling attention and motor output. Primary sensory 
cortic c ed left-si d osens  ccipital areas. The 
former finding most likely reflects processing of sensory input elicited by pressing the 
respon  ital cortex may  sult of i rticipants to fixate a 
small cross in all three unimodal conditions. 
Reorienting to Stimulus Modality During the Mixed-Modality Condition 
The orienting of attention might be subserved by right posterior parietal 
cortex, which showed significantly increased activity in the alertness vs. control comparison 
but did not survive the direct comparison between m  and u alertness conditions 
(see Figure A2). This parietal een associated with stimulus-
driven attentional shifts to a given stimulus location if the stimulus is task-relevant (Indovina 
& Macaluso, 2007). In our experiment, similar stimulus-driven shifts may have occurred 
between m  participant was prepar r a diff ality at the time of 
stimulus occurrence. 
Indovina, luso, E. (2007). Dissociation of stimulus relevance and saliency factors 
during shifts of visuospatial attention. Cerebral Cortex, 17, 1701-1711. 
Ge eral Task-Related Brain A
 comparison versus eline rev
rk hared betwe
ar st es see T
li f the 
liti s (Kansaku et al., 2006; Naito et al., 200 ). Acti
ig t have
sulting fro
s) and from
 et al.: n = cted, the genera
es ommonly activated compris de  somat ory and o
se button; activity in occip be the re ask ng pa
 
 assumed re
ixed nimodal 
region (right angular gyrus) has b
odalities when the ed fo erent mod
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studentische Hilfskraft an den Lehrstühlen für Klinische Psychologie,   
  Biologische Psychologie und Differentielle Psychologie der TU Dresden 
2001  sechsmonatiges Forschungspraktikum im Center for the Treatment and Study 
  of Anxiety an der University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA 
2004  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Differentielle Psychologie der 
  TU Dresden 
2004-2006 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Sektion für Experimentelle Kernspin 
  resonanz des ZNS am Universitätsklinikum Tübingen 
2005  Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine und Biologische 
  Psychologie der Universität Tübingen 
2006-2009 Promotionsstipendiat im DFG-geförderten Internationalen Graduiertenkolleg 
„Schizophrenia and Autism“ (IRTG 1328) an der RWTH Aachen University  
seit 2009 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Arbeitsgruppe Neuropsychiatrische 
Systembiologie an der Klinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie des 
Universitätsklinikums Aachen 
 
 
 
 
rtst g:   26. 09. 1975 
ts rt:  Spre
einem Indikator zentraler Dopaminaktivität und dopaminerg
Persönlichkeits- und Leistungseigenschaften“ 
 
Berufliche Tätigkeiten  
1995-1996 Zivildienst im Kreiskrankenhaus Sprem
1998-2003 
